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
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Special :

ATTACKS AGAINST AGEE ESCALATE

Covert Action

INFORMATION BULLETIN



The CIA
vs.
Philip Agee

Editorial

International events—most notably Iran and Afghanistan, but also Nicaragua, Grenada, El Salvador and elsewhere—have created a climate of hysteria and McCarthyism unmatched in nearly three decades. The media have begun, with considerable justification, to refer to Cold War II. Critics of United States foreign policy must swim against the current, and the current, not to mention the undertow, is strong.

Unleashing the Monster

The cutting edge of such swings to the right is, as it always has been, national defense and national security, and critics of the defense and intelligence apparatus will, in such times, be drawn to the front of the fray.

As we learn in school, the United States government has three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial; all three branches are fighting to “unleash” the CIA. The intelligence agencies and their boosters within the Administration have been quick to take advantage of international tension. The preposterous argument that a stronger CIA with fewer restrictions would have led to different results in Iran or Afghanistan is taken off the shelf, dusted and polished.

In his State of the Union Address, President Carter said, as Admiral Turner appeared on the TV screen smiling broadly, “we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America’s ability to collect intelligence.” In his written

message he mentioned the “need for a strengthened and clearly defined role for our intelligence community.” “We will not shortchange,” he wrote, “the intelligence capabilities needed to assure our national security.” We must “develop new technical means of intelligence collection while also assuring that the more traditional methods of intelligence work are also given proper stress.”

Unfortunately, the victims of “more traditional methods of intelligence work” have had little say in this national debate. They are the dead, the tortured, the maimed, in Vietnam, in Iran, in Uruguay, in Guatemala, around the globe.

The Administration’s “Charter”

In recent months there has been a flurry of legislative activity centering around the role of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Late last year a spate of “Intelligence Identity Protection” bills were introduced—purportedly aimed at this *Bulletin*, but in fact threatening the entire journalistic community. Then, under the aegis of Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, two new elements were added to the cauldron—a proposed law to exempt the CIA from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and another to limit, if not eliminate altogether, Congressional oversight of covert action. Finally, the Senate version of the long-awaited Foreign Intelligence Charter was introduced.

The bill was, in some respects, worse than anything the


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Administration had been publicly asking for, authorizing, in some instances, burglaries and mail openings against U.S. citizens not suspected of crimes, specifically authorizing the use of journalists, academics and the clergy as agents, and other clear steps backwards. Senator Walter Huddleston, the chief sponsor of the bill, noted that the committee members had been able to overcome "purist attitudes" about such minor inconveniences as bugging, tapping and burglarizing innocent people. In all the discussions, of course, it seems to go without saying that the U.S. can do anything to "foreigners"—other peoples in other lands.

This legislative potpourri is discussed and analyzed in detail in this issue of the *Bulletin*.



The Boland Bill

We have reported previously on the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, introduced in October 1979, which would make it a crime for anyone—former CIA employee or private journalist—to disclose the identity of any intelligence employee, agent or source, or even information from which one might ascertain such an identity. After considerable discussion among ourselves, the staff of the *Bulletin* requested, and were granted, the opportunity to present our views in testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence. In this issue we present the full text of our

statement, excerpts of the questioning which followed, and some selections from the presentations of other speakers.

The Anti-Agee Campaign

The beginning of the 1980's brought with it a new, sophisticated, and well-coordinated campaign against Philip Agee. A barrage of false newspaper stories, passport revocations, attempted book bannings, and injunctions, and other legal maneuvers followed one after the other during the first two months of the year. They are described in full in another article in this issue. We can only reiterate our admiration of, and support for, the battle which Agee has waged for more than five years. As his lawyer, Melvin Wulf, said, "Anything that increases public knowledge of the CIA's clandestine activities contributes to world peace."

The Snepp Decision

We have never been political admirers of Frank Snepp, but we have supported fully his right to publish whatever he wished about his former employer. Shortly before we went to print with this issue, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in his case—a travesty of legal reasoning, further proof, if any were needed, that the Court is just another institution which makes political, not legal, decisions. It bodes ill for all the present and would-be whistleblowers, who remain, in some cases, our only hope for exposing governmental atrocities. The courts, like the other branches of government, are wrapping themselves in the flag. They don't realize that to do so is to blindfold oneself.

Also In This Issue

We continue our regular features, *Naming Names* and *Sources and Methods*. Our reasons for continuing to do so are explained in our testimony before the House Committee. The CIA, we are sadly convinced, remains beyond reform.

Several other items of interest to our readers are presented. We apologize for the bit of delay in the publication of this issue, but, as we hope is evident, we have been kept busy by the constant attacks.

To our many charter subscribers who have renewed their subscriptions, our thanks for your continuing support. —

Correction

In *Bulletin* Number 6 we printed the document authored, in 1975, by former Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby. Through our oversight in layout, a large section of the document was inadvertently repeated. The section beginning on page 20, column 1, with "Part III" through the first full paragraph on page 21, ending with "... propriety" should be eliminated.

ATTACKS AGAINST AGEE ESCALATE

For a number of years the CIA relished its description of Philip Agee as its "only ideological defector." Although the writings and speeches of John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti, Jesse Leaf, and others belie this, still the Agency reserves inordinate hatred and vehemence for Agee. Rumors spread, after "Inside the Company" was published, that there were serious offers within the Agency to assassinate him. Whenever a journalist wants a suitably juicy quote, any CIA source can be asked about Agee—most recently, according to UPI: "If I can get him with my bare hands, I'll kill him, I'll kill him."

Agee has lived with this foolishness with some equanimity: "If I were constantly looking behind me," he once said, "I would just trip over my own feet." Still, he has been forced to pack up and move with his family from his homes in England, in France, and in Holland, one after the other, as the local authorities have bowed to petty pressure from the CIA. Now, the campaign has soared to new heights.

The Frame-Up

The Agency has never had any compunctions about fabricating material about Agee whenever it suits their purpose. (Probably the most persistent lie is that it was Agee who named Richard Welch in the pages of *Counter-Spy*; although it has been documented that that naming had nothing to do with Welch's subsequent death, it is also true that Agee had nothing to do with that article in *Counter-Spy*.)

The latest move, however, indicates a high level of sophistication. It began in early December. Agee conceived a possible solution to the problem of the people held in the Tehran Embassy. On the telephone to some diplomat friends, he suggested that the Iranians should offer to exchange the prisoners for the CIA's files on Iran. He urged that someone get that proposal to the Iranians, in hopes of securing the release of the prisoners. The practicality of the suggestion has been questioned in some circles. A former case officer remarked to *CAIB* that the Agency would let 500 people die, never mind 50, before they would ever release any files. But what must be kept in mind is that the conversations with the friends were originally private.

Then, the night of December 16, the plot unfolded. *CAIB* received a phone call from Gregory Rose, a reporter

for the *New York Post*—the paper that Australian press baron Rupert Murdoch has turned into a scandal-mongering rag, the current joke in journalistic circles. Rose, described in a recent *Washington Star* article as a disaffected former member of the U.S. Labor Party of cultist Lyndon LaRouche, wanted Agee's phone number in Germany right away, to call him and get his response to the news item Rose had been "handed" to write up—that the Iranians wanted Agee to sit on a tribunal which, there were rumors, might be established to try the prisoners. It was 3 a.m., and Rose was told that, as far as *CAIB* knew there was nothing to such a rumor, and in any event *CAIB* would try to reach Agee later that day. However, within a few hours, the early edition of the *Post* was on the stands in New York City.

The banner headline, which took up half the front page, read: "CIA Traitor May Judge Hostages." (This was apparently too much even for the *Post*, because later editions changed the word "Traitor" to "Defector.") The article contained this sentence: "A leading Iranian diplomat in the U.S. told the *Post*: 'There will be an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist American on the tribunal and Philip Agee is at the top of our list of candidates.'"

What is significant is that the *Post* never named the "diplomat," the Iranian Embassy and U.N. Mission denied the story, Agee later pointed out that no Iranian had asked him to sit on any tribunal, and, in fact, no such tribunal ever took place, with or without Agee. Moreover, the article, which Rose admitted he was writing, had no by-line.

The next day, both *CAIB* and Agee issued statements explaining that Agee had never been asked to serve on such a tribunal, and, in fact, would not contemplate traveling to Iran while there were people held in the Embassy.

Vance Makes His Move

Five days later, the Administration made its move, through the State Department. A consular official, embarrassed because it was Christmastime, arrived at Agee's apartment in Hamburg and served him with a letter from the State Department informing him that Secretary Vance had decided that "your activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States." This language is from State Department regulations outlining the instances

when, it is said, the Secretary has the authority to refuse to issue someone a passport, or to revoke one already issued. The letter informed Agee that his passport was revoked.

Agee's lawyers went to court to challenge the authority of the Secretary of State to revoke someone's passport simply because the Secretary thinks his activities are not in keeping with U.S. foreign policy. The government's answering papers filed in Court demonstrate how the fabricated *New York Post* story grew in stature. The affidavit of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom, said: "It has been reported in the press (*New York Post*, December 17, 1979) that Mr. Agee has been invited to travel to Iran in order to participate in a Tribunal involving the hostages in Tehran." The original article never said that Agee had been invited by anyone, an assertion he denied, and on which he was never contradicted. The article simply said that an unnamed diplomat said that Agee was on a list of people who might be asked to serve on such a tribunal.

The German Authorities

The degree to which the media are unable to stick with the truth when it comes to Agee is demonstrated in the series of articles which followed the news of the passport revocation, and dealt with the question of Agee's residency in the Federal Republic of Germany. At no point, it should be noted, did the German authorities threaten Agee with deportation. Yet, within two days of the revocation, an AP story circulated stating that local officials were studying the question and deciding whether to deport Agee. This, in fact, was not true, though the headlines said, "W. Germany May Oust Agee." The *New York Times* compounded the error. Its headline read: "West Germany Acts to Bar Agee."

All this time, there was no coverage given to the arguments of Agee's lawyers that the Secretary of State had no authority to do what he had done—that a citizen's passport had been revoked even though the citizen was not charged with any crime, was not under any court order, was not wanted as a material witness, or any of the other limited exceptions wherein one's freedom of movement might be restricted. The concept that a person's passport could be revoked because he disagreed with U.S. foreign policy is ludicrous. As one of Agee's lawyers noted, Henry Kissinger interferes in U.S. foreign policy more in a week than Agee could in a lifetime.

CIA Reactions

Although it is apparent that the passport revocation was part of a well-coordinated plan designed first of all to limit any influence Agee might have with respect to the situation in Iran and secondly to force him back to the United States, official CIA comments were naturally not forthcoming. UPI was reduced to running a story quoting the unnamed intelligence officer who wanted to kill Agee with his bare hands, and a few of Agee's better-known professional enemies, such as former CIA men David Atlee Phillips and Jack Blake.

To The Courtroom

Finally, by year end, articles appeared indicating that Agee denied that he had any plans to travel to Iran. It was almost two weeks after the original *New York Post* article that this information appeared. In the meantime Agee's lawyers had commenced the action in U.S. District Court in Washington, *Agee v. Vance*. The hearing was put off until mid-January, primarily because Agee's lawyers asserted, without contradiction, that he had no immediate travel plans, whatever the newspapers said. The *New York Times*, in the interim, printed an editorial suggesting that it was doubtful that U.S. law permitted lifting Agee's passport. They gave appropriate weight to Rose's *New York Post* article: "The State Department's fear that the former agent will go to Iran seemed based on a misreading of an unconfirmed news report. He says he hasn't been invited and wouldn't accept such an invitation."

At the Court hearing, the Justice Department's performance was pathetic. They now insisted that the passport was not revoked because of any plans for travel to Iran—apparently because there was simply no confirmation that that had ever been in the works. They indicated that the revocation was because Agee spoke out against the CIA all over the world. But, as the Judge pointed out, revoking someone's passport doesn't stop him from speaking. The Justice Department replied that at least it made it more difficult for him to travel around. Several days later the Court ruled that the Department of State had no authority to revoke a passport in the manner they had. The regulations, the Court said, were invalid.



However, the Justice Department immediately went to the next highest court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, and asked for a stay of the District Judge's order directing the return of Agee's passport. To the surprise of many observers, the Circuit Court granted the stay, leaving Agee without a valid passport, despite the victory in the lower court. The case was scheduled for expedited consideration, and will be argued in mid-March.

Gregory Rose had a parting shot. On February 6, he by-lined a brief article with the headline, "CIA turncoat marking U.S. diplomats for death." This rather provocative headline accompanied an article which had no context. It merely quoted "U.S. officials" for seven paragraphs, without saying who was being quoted, what had occurred, or why they were being quoted. All this, ironically, from the same reporter who, when the Embassy was first occupied, called *CAIB* to find out if we had the names of any CIA people in the Embassy.

The Freedom of Information Act Case

The full extent of the government's campaign against Agee became abundantly clear the same day the Circuit Court issued the stay order. Several months earlier, after years of frustrating delays and denials, Agee had filed a Freedom of Information Act suit in federal court against the CIA, the FBI, the Justice Department, the NSA and the State Department, because of their refusal to turn over their files on him. Some agencies, like the State Department, had, in fact, turned over a substantial percentage of

their files on him, but others, like the CIA, had given up virtually nothing. The case was, it was thought, a simple FOIA personal file suit.

To the wonderment of Agee's attorneys, the Justice Department finally filed a request on behalf of the United States government to intervene in the case, and to counterclaim against Agee, requesting an injunction against him preventing him from writing or speaking without first clearing the text with the CIA. This is the same type of injunction which the government had obtained against John Marks and Victor Marchetti several years before. The papers also asked for an injunction against the "imminent" publication of *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*. When it was found that the book was already published, this request was withdrawn (see sidebar).

What was so surprising in this case was that Agee had never set foot in the United States; his lawyers had merely filed suit for his personal files under the FOIA. This case, too, and the entire question of jurisdiction is now pending in the courts.

The Book That Couldn't Be Stopped

Either the Justice Department is guilty of even greater disingenuousness than usual, or the CIA doesn't let its own lawyers know what is going on. Nine days after filing an emergency motion in federal court to prevent the "imminent" publication of *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*, Justice Department lawyers were forced to withdraw the request when they "learned" that the book had already been published.

In August 1979 the publisher, Lyle Stuart, and two co-editors, Ellen Ray and William Schaap, attended the Sixth Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Nonaligned Nations, in Havana. They brought with them copies of a special paperback edition of the book which was presented to dozens of heads of state, foreign ministers and other government officials from around the world.

Copies were also presented to a number of journalists and generally made available. Then, in January 1980 the regular hardcover edition was shipped by Lyle Stuart, Inc. to bookstores around the country. When the Justice Department filed the emergency motion, *Dirty Work 2* had already been available in a number of Washington bookstores for weeks.

What was even more peculiar was that the Justice Department was asking the court to restrain Philip Agee from publishing a book which was not his. The book, which contains two articles by Agee, was researched and edited by four other persons, and is owned by a corporation with which Agee has no connection. Moreover, Agee never asked for, nor received, a penny from the publication of *Dirty Work*

2, or for that matter from *Dirty Work 1*, either.

Lyle Stuart issued a press release charitably describing the Justice Department officials as "ignorant" and "inefficient." *Time* Magazine said the lawyers were "astonished" to learn that the book had already been published. The *Washington Post* said the lawyers were "unaware" the book "has already been on sale in at least one Washington bookstore."

In the court papers withdrawing the request, however, as the Associated Press accurately pointed out, "the department stopped short of admitting its gaffe." In fact, it was worse than that. The papers said: "Before the Court could act upon the United States' motion for intervention or joinder, however, the book was published and available in at least one bookstore in the District of Columbia." This statement is at best misleading, and at worst a deliberate falsehood. It implies that the book was rushed into the bookstores after the motion was filed and before the Court could do anything about it. Aside from ignoring the rather significant fact that Agee does not own the book, and therefore could hardly be ordered to stop its publication in any event, the implication is untrue. It strains credulity to believe that the CIA did not know the book was distributed at the Sixth Summit in August and that it was in bookstores in January.

In the vicious, hysterical campaign against Philip Agee, the U.S. government is unable to stick to the truth. They lie about his intentions; they lie about his travels; they won't even keep it straight who writes what books.

Conclusion

It is hard not to draw the conclusion that the government has set in motion a massive campaign to hound Philip Agee back home, and to gag him. It is only this threat of an injunction which has kept him from returning long ago to the U.S. Agee, who has never been charged with a crime, who has simply spoken out forcefully against the abuses of the U.S. intelligence complex, who has become synonymous with criticism of the CIA, has, at the insistence of the CIA, been forced to move from country to country and been wrongfully accused of assorted heinous acts. It is a measure of the strength of his struggle that he continues to speak out and to fight back.

And the Writer That Could

The Supreme Court's decision in *Snepp v. United States* has shocked most observers and many editorial writers. The Court decided the case without benefit of oral argument from the opposing lawyers, and gave the government more than they had asked for—two extremely unusual actions.

The case appears to have been decided more as a question of contract law than of the delicate balances of freedom of speech and press and national security. The Court held that Snepp's secrecy agreement was a binding contract, and he breached it by publishing his book, regardless of the fact that, as the CIA admitted, there was no classified information in the book. The remedy the Court approved was to apply what is called a "constructive trust" to all of his profits from the book—that is, to require him to turn over to the government every cent he received for the book.

The worst language in the case appears in the footnotes, one of which says: "This Court's cases make clear that—even in the absence of an express agreement—the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment. . . . The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service."

The threat to whistleblowing is clear. The Court is openly limiting the First Amendment rights of government employees. The case also includes much unabashed praise for intelligence services in general, and emphasizes the irrelevance of the argument that the material in question was not classified. Indeed some commentators have suggested that the vehemence of the opinion is related to the breaches of confidence by former and present clerks of the Court which led to much of the scandalous gossip in the recently published book about the Supreme Court, *The Brethren*.

PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Asia Monitor, \$3/issue, from Asia/North America Communications Center, 2 Man Wan Road, 17-C, Kowloon, Hongkong. (A quarterly magazine focusing on U.S. economic involvement in Asia. Very detailed, with a wealth of research information and materials for persons working in this area. Also published by A/NACC: *America in Asia: Research Guide on U.S. Economic Activity in Pacific Asia*, \$10/surface; \$19/air; and *A Survey of Education/Action Resources on Multinational Corporations*, \$2.50.)

Third World, 10 issues, air/\$22; five issues/air/\$12, from Periodistas del Tercer Mundo, Apartado 20-572, Mexico 20, D.F., Mexico. (Approximately monthly, an excellent review of the entire Third World, with perceptive articles from many of the best researchers around the world. The same group also publishes a Spanish edition, *Tercer Mundo*, as well as a Portuguese edition, *Terceiro Mundo*. Write for rates.)

Italy and US, \$6/year, \$10 overseas, from Committee for a Democratic Policy Towards Italy, P. O. Box 32351, Washington, DC 20007. (The bimonthly newsletter of a recently established group working against U.S. intervention in the Italian political process.)

IDAF Publications, on request from International Defense and Aid Fund, Publications Department, 104 Newgate Street, London EC1A 7AP, United Kingdom; overseas requesters should include an IRC. (This is the catalog of the well known publications of Defense and Aid, the group which has, for many years, done some of the best research on Southern Africa. In addition to their own research papers, they publish works by Nelson Mandela, Barbara Rogers, Gillian and Suzanne Cronje, and others. Also available is *Focus*, their bi-monthly news bulletin; subscriptions £3, surface; £5, air.)

Graymail Legislation, Hearings of Legislation Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, August 7, September 20, 1979. From the Committee. (This House Committee pamphlet includes the text of the various pending graymail bills and the testimony of a number of witnesses, including Morton Halperin and Michael Tigar.)

Impact of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act on Intelligence Activities, Hearing of Legislation Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 5, 1979. From the Committee. (This House Committee pamphlet does not purport to present a "balanced view," but instead presents the views of the FBI and the CIA, their arguments and proposals for limiting the FOIA.)

Intelligence Legislation Makes the Rounds

By William Schaap

As we have noted in our Editorial, international developments—especially Iran and Afghanistan—have been used by the CIA and other friends and boosters of the intelligence complex to support and justify a wide range of efforts to “unleash” the CIA. The major battlefield is Congress, and in both Houses numerous proposals are under consideration. What is ironic is that these discussions first began in a very different context.

Originally people were worried about an unrestrained CIA. It was felt that some kind of charter was needed to define the limits beyond which the Agency could not step. There was a fear that existing legislation was too vague and left too many loose ends. Now, although the existing laws have not changed a bit, although there has been as little control of the CIA as ever, the move is on to “unhandcuff” them. Somehow the CIA has created the impression that if it had had a freer hand, things would not have gone as they did in Iran or in Afghanistan. This incredible argument prevails even though the CIA probably had the freest hand in Iran it has ever had—even though it worked hand-in-glove with the Shah and SAVAK for thirty years.

The Major Legislation Pending

There are a number of different bills under discussion, several of which have already been introduced, and some of which have already gone to hearings. This article is an attempt to catalog them for our readers, to give some idea of their scope, and to show what different dangers they pose. We say that because *nothing* that is seriously under consideration right now is aimed at controlling the CIA or the other intelligence agencies; they are all designed to “unleash” them to one degree or another.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act

This is the proposal—ostensibly designed to criminalize our *Naming Names* column—about which we testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Since our testimony is reprinted in full in this issue, along with much of the other testimony and the questioning, this bill need only be summarized here. It contains two provisions; the first makes it a crime for any former government employee with authorized access to classified information identifying intelligence officers, agents or sources to disclose those identities, or information from which those identities could be ascertained. The second provision makes it a crime for anyone else to disclose such information, “with the intent to impair or impede United States intelligence activities.”

As we and several others testified, the bill has a number of serious defects. Although the first provision might not be unconstitutional *per se*—particularly given the outcome of the *Snepp* case (see sidebar this issue)—it severely limits whistleblowing in the entire intelligence field. Also, it is not limited to information which is in fact secret and it is not limited to identities alone. (And, as one witness noted, it even prevents a former CIA officer from saying that he or she used to work for the CIA.)



The second provision, however, is, in our opinion, clearly unconstitutional—a view apparently shared by the Justice Department. Their remedy for this defect, however, is not a very liberal one. They proposed a substitute bill to make it a crime for *anyone* to release classified information, identifying an officer, agent or source, “with the

knowledge that such disclosure is based on classified information." They do not define what is meant by being "based on" classified information. This provision would presumably affect a newspaper editor who received a supposedly classified document in the mail anonymously, a frequent occurrence.

The Justice Department bill also makes the first provision worse. They propose criminalizing the disclosure of an identity by a former employee with "access to information revealing the identities of covert agents," even if the person identified was not one to whose identity the employee had access, and even, for that matter, if the information identifying the person disclosed did not come from classified sources. It proposes a perpetual, broad ban on all former employees.

The Moynihan Bill

Also in January, the Senate took its first steps in this area. Senator Moynihan introduced a three-part bill, S. 2216, which contained the verbatim text of the Boland House bill and two other parts. One was to exempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act all requests about the CIA except for requests by citizens and permanent resident aliens for files about themselves. The other was to repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring advance notice of covert actions to the Congressional Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees, and substituting a provision which required notice "as soon as possible" or notification of a finding by the National Security Agency that the action "does not involve substantial resources or risks."


The first provision, the inclusion of the Boland bill, led to an embarrassed admission from Moynihan on the Senate floor soon after its introduction that he had not studied the bill carefully and that he was going to move to strike from his bill the second provision of the Boland bill, relating to persons other than former government employees. He conceded the provision "might have a chilling effect" on the press.

Moynihan and his co-sponsors, however, have staunchly defended the other parts of his bill. The Freedom of Information Act specifically exempts records which are "properly classified . . . in the interest of national defense or foreign policy," an exemption which in the past Agency spokespersons always defended as adequate. But the CIA, and the Senator, have now taken the position that the *appearance* of additional protection is as important to present and prospective agents as an already sufficient law.

The argument is bizarre, but not as much so as the justifications given for restricting the FOIA to citizens' requests for personal files. It is "absurd," Senator Moynihan said, to allow "an agent of the KGB" to seek intelligence under the Act. But, if classified national defense and foreign policy matters are already exempt from the Act, what is the point? Moreover, the new proposal limiting requests to personal files is a direct attack at the academicians, historians and researchers who have, with the sub-

stantial or partial assistance of the FOIA, published some of the most significant public discussion of intelligence issues in recent years. John Marks' book, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, William Shawcross's book, *Sideshow*, and Dan Morgan's book, *Merchants of Grain*, among others, fall in this category.

The line on the Hughes-Ryan Amendment repeal is equally inconsistent. Even as the bill was introduced, Senator Walter Huddleston, one of its sponsors, admitted that "he knew of no leaks that could definitely be blamed on Hughes-Ryan, but he said that there have been some covert operations the CIA has decided not to undertake because of fear of disclosure." (*Washington Post*, January 24, 1980.) What makes the repeal movement even more foolish is the poorly guarded secret that the CIA has ignored Hughes-Ryan whenever it wished. Finally it came out into the open on February 21, 1980, when Admiral Turner was testifying before Congress in opposition to the Charter introduced a few days earlier (see below).



STANSFIELD TURNER

Under persistent questioning he admitted that he had not always kept Congress informed in advance of anticipated activities. When it was suggested that this contradicted his testimony before Congress at his confirmation hearings that he would have "no difficulty" complying with the advance notice provisions, he waffled. He noted that he had only said he would have no difficulty trying to keep Congress informed, not that he would. A few days later, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd said he would insist on prior notice of covert action.

The Charter

The icing on the cake was presented on February 8, when the National Intelligence Act of 1980 was introduced. This 171-page bill, some three years in the making, was submitted with a special letter of support from President Carter, an Administration synopsis, and lengthy statements from bi-partisan sponsors. As noted above, certain differences between Congress and the CIA were expected, most notably the prior notice provision. Another area of expected disagreement is the express approval of use by the CIA of journalists, clergymen and academics as agents. The Agency wants this provision removed, for obvious reasons. (As with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, though, there is no reason to believe that the CIA has not ignored present minimal restrictions whenever it has suited their purposes.)

But, most shocking to civil libertarians were the provisions of the Charter which permit considerable burglarizing, bugging, wiretapping and mail opening, much of it without even the need for a court order—not that the judges, selected to sit on a special court for such purposes, are to be expected to rally around the protection of individual rights. The bill would, for example, allow a burglary

"No Charter Is Better Than This Charter"

overseas of anyone, U.S. citizen or not, suspected of possessing information "that is essential to the national security of the United States." This means that anyone with any

contacts overseas which might lead the Administration to believe the person has such information—even though lawfully obtained and lawfully possessed—could find his home or office ransacked, because the CIA wanted whatever he or she had.

The Charter also exempts the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act, regardless of the unclassified nature of the information sought, and also includes another version of the Boland bill.

Because of the complexity of the Charter, and because it appears likely that most subsequent debate on these issues will take place within the framework of the Charter, a detailed analysis of the Charter is in order. *CAIB* expects, in its next issue, to present such an analysis and a report on the current status of the various pending bills.

Conclusion

In part because the CIA continues to ask for more than almost anyone is willing to offer, it is unlikely that any of the more serious proposals will be rushed through Congress. It is certainly hoped that there will be increased public awareness of the inherent evils in these bills. Like the fight to prevent the most serious violations of individual rights in the Criminal Code Revision Act (the old S. 1), the struggle will not be easy. Current events are being manipulated by the CIA with a vengeance. For now, however, it is clear that despite the high sentiments voiced some time ago to restrain the CIA, the tide has turned. At this time, no charter is better than the one which has been proposed.

Ghostwriting, CIA Style:

"It is imperative that the 96th Congress clearly and compellingly declare that the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of our intelligence officers and those allied in our efforts will no longer be tolerated."

From the statement of Frank C. Carlucci to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, January 31, 1980

"It is urgent that the 96th Congress clearly and compellingly demonstrate that the unauthorized revelation of the identities of our intelligence officers and those allied in our efforts will no longer be tolerated."

From the statement of Representative Charles E. Bennett to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 1, 1980

STATEMENT OF CAIB BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE, JAN. 31, 1980

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* is pleased to have this opportunity to present its views to you. The three of us comprise the complete staff of the Bulletin.

Let us mention one point before we continue with the prepared statement. We were somewhat concerned yesterday with the references to "so-called journalists" and to persons "purporting" to be journalists. We want to note that Mr. Wolf has been an accredited journalist for fourteen years; Ms. Ray has been a documentary film maker for twelve years, and a writer for the past several years; and Mr. Schaap has been a full-time professional writer for more than four years. Philip Agee, incidentally, who left the CIA ten years ago, has also been a professional journalist since then.

On that subject, let us also clear up some other obvious misconceptions before we proceed. Mr. Agee is neither a director, an officer nor an editor of the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. He does contribute articles to it, although as one could ascertain from reading them, those articles do not name any names. You might all be interested to know that Mr. Agee has *not*, to our knowledge, named any names in at least three years, and that applies to both "Dirty Work 1" and "Dirty Work 2."

Because so much of the discussion which has led to the introduction of H.R. 5615 suggests that it is aimed expressly at us,¹ we would like to touch briefly on our philosophy, and on what, in fact, we do. Although there may be a profound difference between our view of appropriate intelligence work and that which has led to the introduction of a bill such as this, we suggest that our position has been misrepresented.

Our publication, as you are undoubtedly aware, is devoted to exposing what we view as the abuses of the western intelligence agencies, primarily, though not exclusively, the CIA; and to exposing the people responsible for those abuses. We believe that our nation's intelligence activities should be restricted to the *gathering* of intelligence, in the strictest sense. We believe it is wrong, and in the long run extremely detrimental to our democracy, for this country to interfere covertly in the affairs of other countries. We believe that other countries should choose the governments and systems which the people of those countries want for themselves. We also believe that when our government

chooses to support another government and to give it aid, it should do so openly and publicly.²

In this connection, we believe that the CIA, as it is at present, is probably beyond reform; we believe that it should be completely revamped, or abolished altogether, and another new agency created, strictly limited to the gathering of intelligence. In sum we believe that the covert manipulation for which the CIA has become notorious—undercover officers and agents corrupting and bribing officials, buying elections, secretly controlling various media, employing economic and political sabotage, all the way to bombings and assassinations—that this manipulation does not strengthen democracy here in the United States, but in fact weakens it. Indeed, over the past 30 years or so, the CIA has generated more hatred of the United States government around the world than any other single institution. The situation today in Iran, for example, is in large part *because* of the CIA, not in spite of it. If it is a reasonable goal for a nation to try to live in harmony with the rest of the world, the CIA is constantly frustrating that goal for this country.

Before commenting on the specifics of the bill, we would like to try to dispel two myths which affect not so much our actual work as other people's perceptions of it, myths which have clearly affected the deliberations of this Committee.

First of all, there is the myth that exposure subjects a CIA officer to a serious threat of physical harm, even death. This is objectively false. Of the more than a thousand CIA people who have been named over the past five or six years by many people and many publications in many countries, *not one* has been physically harmed on account of it. Indeed they are rarely transferred ahead of schedule. We won't belabor the point here, but you should be aware, as we know the CIA is, that Richard Welch, the CIA Station Chief in Athens, was murdered by people who were originally stalking his predecessor, and that his death had nothing to do with having been named, many times, in various countries over the years, as a CIA officer.³

1. See, for example, the remarks of Senator Bentsen in the *Congressional Record*, May 15, 1979, at S5959-60, and the letter from Admiral Turner to Senator Bentsen, reprinted at S5960. See also the remarks of Representative Boland in the *Congressional Record*, October 17, 1979, at H9324, and the remarks of Representative McClory at H9325. See also the letter to the Editor of the *New York Times* from Representative Boland, published January 15, 1980.

2. The American public—and their representatives in Congress—had no voice, for example, in the now well-documented massive aid to the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, or to the Front for the National Liberation of Angola, or to the anti-Allende parties in Chile, to give just a few examples.

3. See "Communique," by The November 17 Revolutionary Organization, reprinted in "Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe," for confirmation that the group was first watching Welch's predecessor. See, for the manipulation of the murder by the CIA, "CIA News Management," by Morton Halperin, *Washington Post*, January 23, 1977, and Mr. Halperin's Statement to this Committee, January 4, 1978. Mr. Welch was first publicly exposed as a CIA officer in 1968, in "Who's Who in CIA," by Julius Mader. He was also named in newspapers and magazines in both South America and Europe.

In the one instance where physical harm might have been an issue, the taking of hostages in Iran, we have consistently, and against considerable pressure from the media, refused to comment on the identification of anyone involved.

The second myth is that we and others doing similar work have some special access to secret classified information; that it comes from some inside source. This is simply not true. None of us ever worked for the government. The deductions we draw, the journalistic conclusions we come to, that certain persons are in fact intelligence officers, come from dozens of public sources, from research methods well known and well publicized.⁴ Similar deductions and conclusions are made every day by investigative journalists in this country and around the world. The identities of people we and others have exposed are usually quite well known to the host country governments, and we are sure they are already known to the other major intelligence services. Indeed, as this week's *Newsweek* points out, CIA officials admit "the names aren't news to hostile governments."⁵ These undercover people are usually not known, however, to the people of the host country, and to the people of this country, even though their conduct is generally totally, completely illegal in the host country, and often at home.

Finally, we would like to outline our specific arguments regarding H.R. 5615. We believe that the entire bill represents a serious threat to the backbone of our democracy—particularly freedom of the press. The bill is not, in reality, aimed merely at our publication or others like it; it is aimed at journalists generally, and at their sources—at outside investigators and inside whistleblowers. For one thing, the bill is not even limited to exclude exposures of patently illegal activity. Nor is it limited to the exposure of identities learned because of access to classified information, or even to identities at all. The bill censors "any information that identifies" an undercover officer or agent. Yet it is virtually impossible to expose an improper or unlawful or immoral operation or activity in government without disclosing information from which one might ascertain the identity of the persons responsible for such an activity. Whistleblowers have traditionally been this country's greatest weapon against official corruption and immorality. This bill would wipe out whistleblowing in the intelligence field, where it may be most necessary.

Critically, from a constitutional point of view, the bill is not limited to information which is *in fact* secret and classified. This appears to be the first time that something really approaching an Official Secrets Act has been so seriously proposed in the United States. We believe that if truly secret and classified information is exposed, and if it is truly damaging to the national security, then the existing espionage laws are sufficient to protect the interests of the country.

4. Best known, and often reprinted, is "How to Spot a Spook," by John Marks, *Washington Monthly*, November 1974. Similar articles have appeared all over the world.

5. January 28, 1980, p. 32.

Lastly, the idea of specific intent required in the second part of the bill presents another great difficulty. The bill only criminalizes journalism, it appears, if the writer's intent is "to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." But what if the intent is to expose illegality or to engender greater morality in government? The specific intent requirement does not minimize the unconstitutionality of the section. What one person sees as reform another will see as impairment. Indeed, as we said before, we believe that the best thing for the security and well being of the United States would be to limit severely, if not to abolish, the CIA. Our intent both in exposing the abuses of the intelligence agencies and in exposing the people responsible for those abuses is to increase the moral force in this nation, not to lessen it. That many people would disagree with us is clear. That the CIA would assume our intent is simply to impair or impede their foreign intelligence activities also seems likely. Patriotism is to some extent in the eye of the beholder. But it is very distressing that such disagreements could become the substance of criminal prosecutions under a bill such as this.

Our society is supposedly dedicated to openness, to accountability, to continuing reform. Investigative journalists and their sources represent one of the key elements of that tradition. The danger that the hysteria of the moment could subvert that tradition is great. The current move to "unleash" the CIA, of which this bill is just one part, would be, we believe, completely counterproductive. Efforts to exempt the CIA from the Freedom of Information Act and to repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment are equally dangerous.

To conclude, we hope that you understand our motivations; we hope even more that you recognize the effect this bill would have, not on us, but on freedom of the press in this country, and on government morality.

Following the presentation of the CAIB statement, there was an extensive period of questioning by the Committee members. Excerpts of that interchange follow:

Mr. Mazzoli (D., Ky.): Thank you very much. We appreciate your being here, and your statement is certainly quite thought provoking. I have to confess, to be candid with you, that I can see where you might be motivated to disclose the outrages or overreachings of an intelligence agency, but I just really can't quite handle the approach that you take. I recognize that it is important to have a dialogue in America; the beauty of this nation is that we can have people who so very diametrically disagree with one another and still be in the same room together without polemics going back and forth. But I have to say in candor that your view, while carefully reached and zealously held, is, I am sure, that of a very, very small minority throughout the country, and I think legitimately a small part. I would ask you a question. You say that you believe the nation's intelligence activity should be restricted to the gathering of intelligence in the strictest sense. Accepting that that should be its mission, and that anything beyond that is

wrong, does not your activity exactly impede and in many cases interrupt and destroy that intelligence gathering mission?

CAIB: The answer depends upon understanding our philosophy about the CIA. We have no delusions that we have come here to change the minds of the members of the Committee. We have come here to try to explain where we are coming from, and to make clear that we do not use secret documents and do not have any inside line to the CIA, that we work from public research. But our philosophy is that the CIA is in fact an evil instrumentality which is beyond reform because of a tradition which has built up over many years, doing those activities which have been exposed in the press over the past number of years. It is our belief that those activities continue to this very moment. There are members of this Committee who would quite seriously take the position that it is a good thing that they do; we sincerely take the position that it is a very bad thing that they do. We think that one has to start over again, either with a completely revamped agency, or with a new agency.

Mazzoli: I appreciate that, but of course that is not to happen. I wonder if your effort at exposing the wrongdoing doesn't really destroy the mission as you see it, which is to gather intelligence? It certainly doesn't make it any easier.

CAIB: No, we don't think it makes it any easier. Our problem is that the manipulation that we see, the dirty tricks as they're called, are so intertwined. It is our understanding that the vast majority of intelligence gathering, up to 95% of it at least, is done through microwave interception by the National Security Agency, through electronic surveillance, and through the clipping of newspapers. There are we don't know how many thousands of employees at the CIA headquarters in Virginia, analyzing documents, reading books, clipping newspapers. We have no problem with that kind of intelligence analysis.

Mazzoli: Don't you think that you could accomplish your mission, which you have reached very thoughtfully, to reform the intelligence agency, without naming names?

CAIB: Possibly, but our feeling at this point, after working in this area for several years, is that we cannot, partly because of the value it has in many instances in explaining operations. Consider yesterday's comments about the King Hussein story. An editor wouldn't even have put it in the paper, much less on page one, if you didn't say who it was. Also, we feel strongly that you cannot separate the responsibility for the actions from the individual responsibility of the people who do them. If you accept our premise that the CIA station in a foreign country is manipulating, is paying off politicians, is buying elections, is doing whatever else, even putting aside assassinations and the like—if you accept that the manipulation is taking place, the individuals involved are responsible. They certainly know what they are doing.

Mr. Boland (D., Mass.): It's nice to get both sides of the argument, and you presented it very well. As a matter of fact, you even present your *CovertAction Information*

Bulletin very well. It's a slick publication; I mean the format is, and the paper you use is slick, and the information in the *Bulletin* is slick information too.

CAIB: We appreciate the compliment. We might point out that the CIA, as well as Congress, were among our earliest subscribers.

Boland: Well, I would think they would be. Now just a moment ago you referred to the CIA as an evil instrumentality. Is that the description you want to apply to it today?

CAIB: To the extent that the manipulation that we are talking about still takes place, yes.

Boland: Give me one example of some manipulation that is taking place right now that makes it an evil instrumentality.

CAIB: If we knew something that was taking place right now it would be in this issue of the *Bulletin*. We can only tell you about what *was* taking place. There is no past experience to give us reason to believe the Agency when it makes the comment, in whatever words, that "We don't do that any more." We say that because over the years, every time that has been said, and on several occasions to this Congress, by officials of the Agency, under oath, it has turned out to be untrue. We don't mean that everything that is going on rises to the level of the intervention in Chile, or the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran, or Guatemala, and so on. We simply feel to a moral certainty that it is going on right now. We are sure that politicians are being paid off right now by our government through the CIA; we are sure there are elections being bought right now by the CIA. We will find out about them a year from now.

Mr. McClory (R., Ill.): You say that one of the aims of the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* and those who are associated with it is to stop illegal or immoral activity. Is that a fair statement of what you believe?

CAIB: Yes.

McClory: Is the issuance of fake passports illegal in your opinion?

CAIB: We would imagine in every country in the world it is illegal, yes.

McClory: Would you be critical of the government of Canada for issuing fake passports to the Americans who were secreted out of Iran? If the Canadian government did that would you be critical of them for engaging in illegal activity?

CAIB: Not that illegal activity, no. We are not critical that they assisted in helping these people to escape, nor are we critical that, according to the newspapers the CIA assisted in forging some visa stamps on the passports in order to assist them to escape. We are somewhat critical of the mass media for having published the fact.

Boland: Now you also say that your intent is to expose

abuses and that H.R. 5615 would criminalize whistle-blowing. What abuses does your *Naming Names* section reveal? What abuses come to the surface as a result of your naming names and your books?

CAIB: That information, in particular instances, especially instances of diplomatic cover officials in embassies, would only come to light thereafter, and would be recognized by the citizens of the host country. In most cases where we are simply reporting on a case officer in a country, we don't know *precisely* what he is doing. As we have said, you have to understand our philosophy which posits that a large part of what he is doing is wrong, and that it is bad for this country that he is doing it. It generally only comes out afterwards what the specific thing might be.

McClory: My principal observation is that, while your testimony and the activity of this publication appear to be directed at the abuses of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, what we are dealing with ourselves are what we regard as abuses of First Amendment rights, which we feel threaten the destruction and loss of these First Amendment privileges which we have. I've made mention several times of the change in direction the liberal community appears to be taking as a result of the tremendous threats of the KGB and other covert operations of adversary nations. What if anything have you done to try to expose any of the covert operations of any persons that I would regard as our enemies, those that are trying to destroy these First Amendment rights that you purport to be championing?

CAIB: We don't know very much about the KGB. But you should understand that if they are doing the same things that we say we don't like the CIA doing, we don't like their doing it either. The point we are trying to make is that we are Americans, and we know about our government. We are trying very hard to make it, in our opinion, a better government. We certainly hope that there are citizens of the Soviet Union trying hard to make their government a better government. We hope there are people like that everywhere.

McClory: To justify your publication and your position, you suggest that people in all nations should have the right to choose the government they want. Yet it seems to me that what you are contributing to is denying the opportunity to people to have the kind of government they want.

CAIB: We think that it is important to remember that for the United States to stand as a beacon before the world, it must demonstrate and carry out its principles.

McClory: You don't think we are?

CAIB: Well, we think the CIA stands for quite the opposite of what we are talking about.

McClory: Do you think that if the CIA or any agencies, covert or overt, support the opportunity for people to vote in free elections, that that is contrary to our interests, and can you tell me of any instance where any of our intelligence agencies have tried to suppress that opportunity?

CAIB: The most obvious example is that they pumped many millions of dollars into the Christian Democratic Party in Italy, for example.

McClory: Do you think western free Europe is anti-American?

CAIB: We have a profound difference of opinion. All we're saying is that it is wrong for this country secretly to pump millions of dollars into the coffers of a particular political party in another country. We think it is wrong for anyone to do that.

McClory: I can only observe that you are not answering the question.

Mazzoli: Let me ask you this. You seek to disabuse the Committee of any thought that you use clandestine means to get your information, that you work with public records and what have you. You say here that you don't have some special access. Now this special access is important, because the staff has handed me a copy of your April-May 1979 issue, in which there is a very long secret document, Department of State, dealing with something that occurred in Europe. This is the first time I've seen your publication, so apparently you do use classified information also. Perhaps the use of that document can be squared with your statement, but it seems like you're leading the Committee to believe that classified information doesn't play a part.

CAIB: That particular example can be explained very easily. This document appeared, prior to our publication, in an Italian newspaper called *La Repubblica*, in full, and one of the reporters for *La Repubblica* sent us a copy in the mail, and additionally we received two other copies in the mail anonymously. In fact, it had appeared in full in an Italian newspaper and was not secret.

Mazzoli: Maybe I'm wrong, because I really don't want to read anything especially into this, but in your statement you say that despite the entreaties of your colleagues in the fourth estate, you have not succumbed, and you haven't given out the names of the CIA people, if any, in Tehran, and you take some small issue with the papers for having published the fact that allegedly the CIA helped doctor the visas.

CAIB: For having published it while there are hostages being held. We wouldn't mind it being published after there was a different situation.

Mazzoli: It seems to me that you are trying to have it both ways. You are trying to indicate that you have a certain honor, if you will, or righteousness in how you approach this, and at the same time, you, without any backward looks, publish names, some of which are not even correct. If they're correct possibly your righteousness has been displayed and demonstrated concretely, but sometimes there are wrong names. Sometimes you finger the wrong people.

CAIB: Nobody has ever proved that to our satisfaction, we might add. No one has ever sued us for being named, no

one has ever threatened us for being named, no one has ever pointed out a mistake.

Mazzoli: Well, I would hardly think that people would ever sue you, for obvious reasons, because if they are an agent or not, the very fact that suit is brought, demonstrates that the cover is blown. The matter has been confirmed in that action. I wonder why you would argue with what the papers have done. I mean why would that concern you, give you trouble?

CAIB: It gives us trouble because we are very sensitive to this aspect of putting people's lives in danger. Ever since the Welch assassination there has been an assumption on the part of many people that it was caused by his having been named in *CounterSpy*, when in fact that wasn't true. The real problem is that in March of this year Admiral Turner admitted in a speech at Johns Hopkins that perhaps it was true that the naming of Welch in *CounterSpy* had nothing to do with his being killed, but that that was irrelevant to the issue then being discussed. We have had to live with that for a number of years. We are not in favor of putting anyone's life in danger, and we don't believe that we do. The situation in Iran is *sui generis* and that is why we feel so concerned. It is not a principle that relates to naming names.

Mazzoli: Well, let me thank you again. As I say, there is a profound disagreement between the two of us, but I think that you do serve a very useful purpose to this Committee in explaining your position and the perspective which you use in doing your work.

Boland: Where do you draw the line at exposing secrets? Is it okay to name names of agents, but not the details of reconnaissance satellites, for instance?

CAIB: Well, we don't know very much about reconnaissance satellites.

Boland: Have you ever published anything with respect to reconnaissance satellites?

CAIB: To our knowledge we have not published anything with respect to reconnaissance satellites.

Boland: If you had information with respect to highly secret reconnaissance satellites, I presume that you would print it?

CAIB: We are not so sure, unless we had a situation where it related to manipulation of events or dirty tricks. As we said, as we have stated publicly many times, we are not against intelligence in that sense.

Boland: All right. Where do you draw the line at exposing secrets? You're in the business of exposing secrets, are you not?

CAIB: In part. Let us point out that we publish a 32 or 36 page magazine, one or two pages of which may be devoted to naming names and unfortunately we must live with the fact that nobody talks about the rest of it. We do

publish investigative pieces and political analyses and reports which don't name names but discuss politics around the world.

Boland: I suppose one of the reasons why people center on naming names is because to a lot of people that is very serious. What do you know about the one thousand individuals that you have exposed that leads you to believe that they are performing individually illegal acts, and what makes you so confident that no harm has come to those whose names have been exposed, or disclosed, or harassment to their families? You really don't have that knowledge, do you?

CAIB: We feel fairly certain that if any serious harm had occurred to anybody we had named, the Press Office of the CIA would have called a press conference and had it on the wire services instantly. The Welch assassination—they had a press conference called before he was in his coffin.

Boland: Well, I'm not sure they would do that. The CIA can respond to that when we interview them. I'm not sure they would respond in the way that you have indicated, because I think that may well lead to harm to others. I presume you would agree that harm can be done to families, they have to move, they have to pull up their roots in a particular country when the name of an agent is disclosed, and harassment can easily occur and has occurred, many, many times to the homes and the families of those who are connected with the intelligence community in various countries whose names have been disclosed. Now, would you consider that to be harmful?

CAIB: We are not sure what you mean by harassment, but we have no knowledge of any that has occurred. We are against physical harm, and have no knowledge that any has occurred. But frankly, within the ambit of our philosophy, which is that we think the Agency is beyond reform and ought to be revamped, our aim is to try to stop it from continuing to do what it is doing. If it were proved to our satisfaction that it didn't do those things, we would feel completely differently.

Boland: Let me ask you again. What abuse are you stopping by naming names? You mention the abuses of the intelligence community, the abuses of the CIA, and naming names to me doesn't stop whatever abuses you are concerned about.

CAIB: Well, it stops a large area, we think, or we hope, which has to do with the undercover officers obtaining the confidence of persons in various positions in other countries by pretending to be something other than what they are. The only way they can really get to meet, let's say an opposition politician or a labor union leader in circumstances where they can hope to corrupt that person and cause that person to become an operative for them would be by having this cover, pretending to be something else.

Boland: But how do you obtain intelligence in foreign countries without cover?

CAIB: Again, you must understand our philosophy

about the CIA as an institution and the abuses which it has committed. If there were a fresh start and it were simply intelligence gathering, if there were a different *esprit de corps*, if there was not what we sense, a veneer which has built up over many years of allowing an agency to think it can do virtually anything it wants throughout the world, including killing, murdering, bombing, and everything under the sun, if it weren't for that, we would feel differently.

Boland: I don't think a lot of people would disagree with that. The abuses have been extensive in the past, but the question is whether they are present now, and I am convinced they are not. In any event, is your bottom line that the United States should not be engaged in any covert activities? Is that a fair assessment of one of your positions?

CAIB: No. Any covert *manipulation*.

Boland: What's the difference between covert manipulation and covert activity?

CAIB: If someone undercover is quietly attending political rallies and making notes of what the political temper in the area is, and so on, that's one thing. If on the other hand the United States, through the CIA, is paying money to certain political parties so that they can have more election propaganda and win the election, that is something else.

McClory: Reading from one of your advertising letters you sent with complimentary copies of your *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, inviting the person to subscribe, you mention not only *Naming Names*, but you say, "We also commence with this issue a column entitled *Sources and Methods*, dealing with some of the more unusual techniques, technical accomplishments of the intelligence complex." It seems to me that it is inherent in the intelligence community, as we develop techniques and methods and sources for gathering information—which is the principal activity of intelligence work, not to expose them to persons who would utilize them in a way that would be adverse to our national security interests. How do you justify publicizing that kind of activity?

CAIB: If you had read the column in question, you would discover that it does not deal with secret information, that it deals with public information reported in books and scholarly journals. The particular article in question—which was covered all over the world—dealt with using essence of cockroach to track people, and how powerful it was as opposed to almost any other substance. It was quite humorous, was picked up by many wire services, but it came from a public book which many people know about.

McClory: You make the pretense that you identify CIA officers by reading publications, but both your magazine and the book *Dirty Work* by your contributing editor Philip Agee and Mr. Wolf list as sources "Paris Embassy sources, Athens Embassy sources, Department of State sources." So you have these people who apparently spy for you and on other Americans, do you not?

CAIB: Well, that is a bit of an overstatement.

McClory: Are these covert agents for the *CovertAction* publication?

CAIB: No. By and large, those are people simply confirming that CIA case officer Joe Smith is in fact at the Paris Embassy. It is very often done by picking up the telephone, calling the Embassy, and asking for Joe Smith. Joe Smith gets on the phone. As many witnesses testified yesterday, it is very simple, from a number of books and magazines, to discover that a certain supposed State Department employee is in fact a CIA case officer. If the diplomatic list published by the government of France lists him as being in Paris as of a certain date, you have a friend in Paris who can pick up the phone, call the Embassy, and ask for him. If he answers the phone, then we have ascertained, through our "source in Paris," that he is there.

McClory: Do you think that if we publish your testimony here, it would kill the circulation of your magazine?

CAIB: We doubt it.

McClory: Now you mention the book, *Who's Who in the CIA*, by Julius Mader. That's a book that did what you do now, back in 1968.

CAIB: Far less accurately, we might add.

McClory: What you neglected to mention was that the book was a product of the East German government, and that the false identification in the book of a man by the name of Dan Mitrione resulted in his murder by terrorists. What do you know about Mader and his activities?

CAIB: We don't know him; we know of him. We have a copy of the book, and there are a number of inaccuracies in it. We would take issue with the description of Mr. Mitrione, though. He received his pay check, we understand, from AID and not from the CIA, and in that sense was not a CIA employee. But former Agency employees have mentioned in books, other people have written books, that in fact he was doing a CIA case officer's job. We really don't know much about it; we have read books ascribing rather terrible things to Mr. Mitrione.

McClory: You justify your publication and that naming names is harmless because nobody's been killed or murdered. This should suggest to you that this is very, very dangerous business, and very, very dangerous to the individuals and the families of those persons whose names you name.

CAIB: If it were true, it would, but we don't believe it is true. At least from what we have read, vast numbers of people in Uruguay knew who Mr. Mitrione was, and knew that he worked with the secret police and knew that he was involved in the securing of implements of torture and so on.

McClory: What's your rate of accuracy in the *Naming Names* column?

CAIB: As we said, we think it is 100%. We try very hard to err on the side of caution, and have rejected hundreds of names.

McClory: I think there will be considerable dispute over whether or not it is 100%, and if it is not, then those who've been named have been falsely accused, haven't they?

CAIB: If we ever found out we had done that, we would print a retraction and an apology, but we really don't think that we have.

McClory: Well I'm glad you say that. I think you have some duty to those who have been falsely named in the *Naming Names* column. Thank you.

Mazzoli: Thank you, Mr. Schaap, Mr. Wolf, and Ms. Ray.

Excerpts From Other Speakers and Committee Questioning

A number of people testified at the House Committee hearings, some in favor, some against, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. CAIB reprints here some excerpts from those statements, and Committee questioning. These selections are by no means comprehensive, but are included here to give a flavor of the proceedings.

Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of Intelligence:

I do not believe there is any justification or excuse for the deliberate, public disclosure of the identities of personnel having concealed employment or other relationships with intelligence agencies of the United States government.

Those who seek to destroy the intelligence activities of the United States have propagated a number of fallacies. Unfortunately some of these have found their way into discussions of H.R. 5615 in the press and elsewhere.

One of these fallacies is that accurate identification of CIA personnel under cover can be made merely by consulting publicly available documents, like the State Department's *Biographic Register*, and therefore the bill would impinge on discussion of information that is in the public domain. This is untrue. . . . It is only because of the disclosure of sensitive information based on privileged access and made by faithless government employees, such as Philip Agee and John Marks, with the purpose of damaging U.S. intelligence efforts that the public has become aware of indicators in these documents that can—and sometimes do—distinguish CIA officers.

This, however, is not the full extent of the problem. A substantial number of the identifications made by such

avowed enemies of United States intelligence activity as the publishers of *CovertAction Information Bulletin* have been accurate. This indicates that they are based on extensive investigation, using many of the same techniques as any intelligence service uses in its counterintelligence efforts—in effect, spying on the United States.

There is nothing that has been more damaging to morale and to the effectiveness of the Agency . . . I happened to arrive in one country on a trip about seven or eight months ago and was greeted at the airport by a young officer, who had that very morning been exposed in one of these so-called bulletins—*CovertAction Bulletin*. He was an able young officer, who had worked for eight or ten years and had concealed his identity. He had valuable assets in the country. All of that is now worthless . . . Clearly this has been highly damaging to our intelligence capability overseas.

One place in his formal presentation, the Deputy Director may well have been guilty of himself leaking secret, and potentially damaging information. Blaming the naming of names, the Freedom of Information Act, and other public exposures, he told those assembled:

Nearly all major foreign intelligence services with which we have liaison relationships have undertaken reviews of their relations with us.

While of course the CIA maintains "liaison" relationships with a number of "major foreign intelligence services," this rather specific public declaration made by Carlucci reveals, at least to a certain extent, the status of relations between a fairly narrow circle of "major" foreign services and the CIA, principally among them the British MI-6, the French SDECE, the Canadian RCMP, the Australian ASIO, and the New Zealand service.

Carlucci continued:

Finally, a statute should require proof that unauthorized disclosures by those who have not had an employment or other relationship of trust with the United States were made with a specific intent to impair or impede the nation's foreign intelligence activities. This requirement would be for the protection of those who might claim they have made a public disclosure for a legitimate purpose, although I believe Congress should determine if there are any such purposes and make provision for them. For example, if the Congress finds that current requirements and procedures for reporting allegations of illegal or improper activity by intelligence employees may not be sufficient to discover such activity, it could provide in statute for direct reporting to the Congress, or to the Attorney General, or even to the President. In this way it could be made clear that there is no justification for the public disclosure of protected intelligence identities.

Robert L. Keuch, Associate Deputy Attorney General:

Speaking of the second part of the bill:

In proposing a section of such breadth, the House bill

marches overboldly, we think, into the difficult area of so-called "born-classified" information, an area that has not yet been litigated in a criminal context. The House provision would cover disclosures of publicly available information made by ordinary citizens, who claim no special expertise in intelligence affairs and have not held special positions of trust nor associated with others who have. Conversational speculation about whether foreign official X may have been a CIA source and whether we have covert operatives in country Y, ordinary discussions by citizens about foreign affairs and the extent and nature of our intelligence activities abroad, even if based on no studied expertise or scholarly background, could come chillingly close to criminality under the standard of §501 (b).

The scienter requirement—that an individual must have acted with "intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States"—is not a fully adequate way of narrowing the provision. First, even such a scienter standard would have the effect of chilling legitimate critique and debate on CIA policy. A mainstream journalist, who may occasionally write stories based on public information mentioning which foreign individuals are thought to have intelligence relationships with the U.S., might be fearful that any later stories critical of the CIA could be used as evidence of an attempt to "impede" foreign intelligence activities. Speculation concerning intelligence activity and actors abroad would be seemingly more hazardous if one had ever taken even a general position critical of the conduct of our covert foreign intelligence activity.

**Jerry J. Berman, Morton H. Halperin and John Shattuck—
for the American Civil Liberties Union:**

H.R. 5615 is not contained within a comprehensive charter nor is it narrowly drawn. It poses a double danger. If passed as separate legislation or part of a "package" such as the ones proposed by Senator Moynihan and others last week (S. 2216), the measure would all but end the effort to enact an intelligence charter. Once the intelligence agencies obtain the authorizations they seek, they will not be very interested in legislated restrictions. If passed in its present form, the measure seriously infringes on the Freedom of Speech and Press guaranteed by the First Amendment.

While there may be justifiable reasons for protecting all agents and sources in some circumstances, the breadth of the protection has grave implications for inhibiting open discussion of foreign policy and intelligence matters . . .

[The first part of the bill] could be read to prohibit a former government official who had access to classified information from disclosing the identity of an agent based on wholly public information obtained since leaving the government . . .

We believe that this prohibition is unconstitutional and unwise because it would chill public debate on matters of great public importance. Recognizing the importance of public discussion of national security matters, the courts have found laws punishing dissemination or publication of information in the public domain constitutionally defective.

[They cited the statement of Attorney General Keuch before the House Committee hearing about "Espionage Laws and Leaks" on January 24, 1979, saying he] accurately and succinctly summed up the decisions of the courts as holding that no one can be convicted of espionage or the compromise of information relating to the national defense 'if the information was made available to the public, or if the government did not attempt to restrict its dissemination or if the information was available to everyone from lawfully accessible sources.'

In our view, the inhibition on public discussion is not cured by the requirement that the government prove from evidence other than the disclosure itself that a person acted with the "intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." Would criticism of CIA activities indicate an "intent to impair or impede?" What if the foreign intelligence activity impeded were illegal? Would a government warning that to publish would subject a person to punishment evidence evil intent if the warning were ignored?

Speaking about the second part of the bill:

Suppose that the student newspaper at a university discovers that the head of its European campus has been an agent, informant or source of operational assistance to the CIA, and suppose that the paper publishes that fact asserting that it does not believe that university officials should cooperate secretly with the CIA. Would the newspaper not be in violation of the proposed statute?

Mr. Chairman, in our view this section of H.R. 5615 is vague and overbroad and clearly unconstitutional.

Speaking of the first part of the bill:

It is simply not clear what is intended by the "any information" formulation of Section 501(a) and we urge an amendment to make it clear that the provision is limited to those identities learned by an individual in the course of his or her official duties.

. . . we believe that the provision should apply only to lawful activity and hence to the disclosure of names of agents or employees performing lawful intelligence functions. Some protection for "whistleblowers" is in order.

. . . we believe that there should be an exemption which permits an individual to be free from penalty for revealing the fact that he or she is or has been an agent, employee, or source of the CIA or other intelligence agency.

Finally, we are concerned that even a narrowly drawn statute not become the vehicle for investigating or harassing the press on the grounds that it is publishing information provided to it illegally. We therefore applaud the restrictions in [the proposed bill] relating to the conspiracy laws which bar their use except where there is an intent to impair or impede a foreign intelligence activity. However, we would urge the Committee to go further and make it clear that no journalist can be subject to investigation because he or she publishes a story which includes the name

of an agent and that journalists may not be called before a grand jury and compelled under penalty of contempt to reveal sources of information.

Reform of the espionage laws should start with the principle that activities of private persons related to publication or other public dissemination of information is not a violation of the law.

We believe the public will act responsibly if the agencies do the same. An intelligence charter is the central vehicle for establishing the ground rules on which public trust can be built. A criminal statute passed in the midst of perceived crisis without a charter could have the very opposite effect from what is intended. If the statute is meant to signal a return to secrecy and business as usual rather than reform and lawfulness, agents may be put in jeopardy by those who perceive that the glare of publicity is the only "check" on intelligence abuses. Moreover, instead of reaching these persons, guided or misguided, the statute will likely adversely affect those who are committed to democratic institutions.

Candidate Carter told the American people in 1976 that we had gone astray abroad when policies were decided and implemented in secret. Nothing that has happened since would suggest that that judgment was not correct.

Ford Rowan—until recently NBC Pentagon Correspondent, now a visiting professor in journalism at Northwestern University:

The disclosures of recent years, although widely condemned by some as undermining the effectiveness of the CIA, may actually have helped intelligence officers regain an understanding of their duty *within* the constitutional framework. Publication of the investigative findings may have contributed to a healthier intelligence community by refocusing its attention on its proper role and deemphasizing the undue stress on covert operations, some of which were directed against law-abiding American citizens.

... reporters believe in many of the same values as you. The First Amendment confers enormous power upon journalists and most of us feel that the responsibilities are enormous. Most of us are patriots, but the day is past when simply waving the flag will convince a reporter or editor to kill a story without exceptionally compelling reasons.

Too many reporters have seen the phrase "national security" used to try to hide embarrassing and illegal conduct by government agencies.

In covering intelligence activities a reporter had to exercise judgment when deciding which way to direct his investigatory efforts, in deciding which facts to stress or omit, when deciding which activities should be disclosed. For example, when I broadcast the first story about computerized electronic surveillance by the National Security Agency in 1975 I felt that the domestic spying, directed by an agency involved in foreign intelligence gathering against American citizens, was so newsworthy that disclosure out-

weighed any arguments about sensitive sources and methods being compromised. I cite this example because it was a hard case and one that could still spark disagreement today.

I realize that intelligence officers and many public officials feel very uncomfortable knowing that journalists—unelected and sometimes unwashed—sit in judgment on their conduct. Aside from reminding you that this is a result of the First Amendment, I would like to stress that most American journalists try to make responsible judgments.

The First Amendment wasn't just designed for mainstream journalists. In fact, it wasn't designed for institutions at all. The First Amendment was designed for Tom Paine, who printed up pamphlets. And so if the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* was mimeographed in somebody's basement, it has the same protection. You can make the argument that's what the Constitution was designed to protect—an individual or small group printing up stuff. And I think you're stuck with it. I don't think you can legislate what they can and cannot print.

... At the Committee's invitation I have examined the proposed legislation to make it a crime to reveal the identity of a clandestine American intelligence officer or his agent.

I have tried my best to avoid letting where I sit (in the press gallery) determine where I stand on this issue. But as a journalist I cannot consider this legislation without becoming concerned about preserving First Amendment rights.

Speaking of the first part of the bill:

... Some people will leak information no matter what the rules, no matter what the penalties. An insider who feels strongly enough about the wrongful nature of a clandestine operation to disclose it will make his decision on whether to also name names for reasons unrelated to potential criminal penalties.

Speaking of the second part of the bill:

... unlike CIA or military intelligence officers, reporters have taken no oath to keep secrets. Second, reporters should not be forced by Congress—in effect—to take a secrecy oath. That's what this bill would do.

... Reporters who named names to get at the truth about the (CIA) assassination plots (against foreign leaders) usually were opposed to such plots and wanted to assure they did not recur. People who revealed such plots and the plotters wanted to impair this form of intelligence activity, yet they hoped—in most cases—that this would help the United States regain some of the respect it had lost in the world.

In sum, it is a mistake to decree that all foreign intelligence activities of the United States equally merit secrecy. Some should be exposed, denounced, dismembered. Congress should not pass legislation which interferes with the

First Amendment right to expose illegal, immoral, and unethical conduct.

My feeling, however, is that neither injunctions nor criminal penalties provide much control over the flow of information. Look how unsuccessful the federal government was when it tried to enjoin publication of the *Progressive* magazine article on how to build an H bomb. If you cannot stop disclosure of atomic secrets I doubt if the government could stop disclosure of the names of some of its spies. Spilling H bomb secrets seems much more threatening to national survival.

The H bomb article was based in part on unclassified information available in government libraries open to the public. That factor in that episode could have relevance to our discussion today, for this bill would punish a reporter who combed through open sources such as biographic registers to identify covert officers and agents. The government extracts a high price from journalists when it seeks to punish them for revealing what the government was too inept to keep secret.

Democracy works best that knows most. Some conflicts between the press and government are healthy—symptomatic of a dynamic society with competing values. An independent press with watchdog functions, the tradition of open criticism, the disclosure of corruption, the reform of institutions—these all contribute to a vibrant society.

Society—the public—pays a price when government attempts to seal off part of its activities from public view. In some cases the courts have sided with due process and privacy rights in limiting access to information by the media. In other cases the courts have evaluated then decided against claims that publication of certain information would harm national security.

While First Amendment guarantees may not be absolute, they should be tampered with very cautiously. This proposed legislation is unnecessary, unworkable, and unconstitutional.

Floyd Abrams—Constitutional lawyer and First Amendment expert:

... I appear before you for the primary purpose of urging upon you that Section 501 (b) of the proposed legislation—the section relating not to agents or the like, but to the rest of us, including the press—is flatly and facially unconstitutional; that it is, as well, unwise; and that, on reflection, it should be rejected. And I appear to urge that Section 501 (a) is, as now drafted, of extremely dubious constitutionality.

The effect of such a statute would be startling and unprecedented. Under the terms of the statute, when Francis Gary Powers was captured by the Russians for over-flying their air space in a U-2, every publication in the United States that published Mr. Powers' name would have been subject to criminal prosecution under the statute until the Executive Branch of the United States "had publicly ac-

knowledge or revealed the intelligence relationship to the United States" (Section 501 (a)) of Powers. This would have been possible, notwithstanding the fact that Powers' name was widely, indeed internationally, known; that the Russians had themselves revealed Powers' capture; and that, indeed, Powers was then facing charges in the Soviet Union. It is true that under the statute, all who mentioned Powers' name could have defended on the ground that they did not "intend to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States." But the effect of this would simply have been to permit different results as to different individuals who had done precisely the same thing: to disclose what had already been disclosed.

I would go further. Subject to its exceptions, the statute would not only have made it a crime for the news media to disclose Powers' name, but for each and every American who read it or heard it to repeat the name.

One could cite many other examples of material which, I believe, should have been and should be published, and as to which publication under Section 501 (b) would subject all connected with prospective criminal liability. What of, for example, a situation in which it is learned that an intelligence operative is acting illegally under American law, by, for example, spying on Americans who have done nothing wrong but oppose those in power? What of a student who learns that his professor has been recruited by the CIA in violation of law and wishes to tell others of that fact? What of any instance of criminal wrongdoing by the CIA or any other intelligence operation? On its face, Section 501 (b) puts at risk all who would disclose such illegal acts—whether they refer to the name of the individuals who have committed the acts or simply provide "any information" from which such identification could be made.

These examples illustrate some of the ways by which Section 501 (b) may operate to restrict freedom of expression. At its core, Section 501 (b) flies in the face of a first principle of the First Amendment: While government may try to keep information secret, the disclosure of information which has already become public may not later be criminally punished. Indeed, as phrased by Chief Justice Burger, "The government cannot restrain publication of whatever information the media acquires—and which they elect to reveal."

Beyond these objections to Section 501 (b), I would urge the Committee to consider this question: law aside, even constitutional law aside, is it really necessary for the first time in our nation's history to attempt to make criminal the publication of material which is essentially within the public domain? I would urge upon you that it is not and that whatever you may decide to do with respect to the disclosure by CIA agents or the like, that you adopt no legislation which bars the rest of the American people from disclosing fully the activities of our Government of which they learn. To do otherwise would not only deprive the public of information: it would deprive us all of credibility as we deal with each other—press with public, citizens with each other.

William E. Colby—former Director of Central Intelligence, now in private law practice:

In speaking in favor of the proposed legislation, Colby asserted that we and others "have developed a cottage industry of exposing fellow Americans," and suggested that it is like "being shot in the back."

The dangers to intelligence personnel abroad have been increased in recent years by the sensational and irresponsible exaggeration of a comparatively few incidents in the history of CIA, to give a totally false impression of the scale of its missteps and misdeeds and stimulate attention and hostility to its activities.

Jack Blake—President, Association of Former Intelligence Officers

In the aftermath of excessive charges and the many ill-founded allegations of the mid-70s, this legislation is a concrete step to enhance the effectiveness of intelligence.

Speaking of the last issue of CAIB (Number 7), in particular to the Naming Names section, he declared:

I will not address myself to the accuracy of the identifications because to do so would be to give aid and comfort to the enemy.

Sources and Methods

(continued from page 36)


then opened hearings on the subject. But within a few months the entire inquiry had been effectively sabotaged, and little was revealed.

According to the Committee's report, the CIA had sought to assassinate only a few individuals, and in every case its plots had flopped. In almost all of the cases investigated, by amazing coincidence, someone else succeeded where the CIA had failed: Patrice Lumumba of the Congo in 1960, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic in 1961, Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam (assassinated together with his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu) in 1963, and General Rene Schneider in Chile in 1970. Also, in 1960, an attempt by the CIA to "incapacitate" an unnamed leftist Iraqi colonel came to naught, but instead he "suffered a terminal illness before a firing squad in Baghdad."

So despite the CIA's alleged ineptness, in all those instances the Committee considered, each of the intended victims was killed, with the exception of Fidel Castro. (The Church Committee also "received evidence" of CIA assassination plots against Francois Duvalier of Haiti, Sukarno of Indonesia, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara, but these were not described in detail or evaluated.)

Writing at the same time the Church Committee was conducting its investigation, journalist Tad Szulc described several of the CIA assassination plots later confirmed in the Committee's report plus another one they failed to include—a 1958 plan to poison Chou En-lai during a visit to Burma combined with a "black" propaganda campaign that would have blamed the Soviet KGB for his

death (*Penthouse*, August 1975).² Szulc also pointed out "the possibility of murders of lesser-known figures" (reports that the CIA contemplated killing Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko after completing its interrogation of him, the "accident" that befell a young hitch-hiker who had



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stumbled onto secret preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the "suicides" that plague so many agents caught spying for other countries, would fall into this category), while the Committee concerned itself only with "alleged" assassinations of "foreign leaders."

Szulc went on to describe the CIA's "complicated and cumbersome procedure" for planning an assassination, beginning with the "political decision" by the Deputy Director for Operations (Clandestine Services) "that the United States interest would be served by the murder of a foreign leader." His "Staff D" would then study the operational aspects of the plan. Once having cleared the Clandestine Services, the Counterintelligence staff would check to make sure the target wasn't secretly a CIA source, and that the plot couldn't be traced back to the Agency. The Technical Services Division would then recommend the mode of assassination. Final approval was supposedly up to the 40 Committee, but according to the Church Committee, approval by the 40 Committee and its predecessors was bypassed in the plots against Castro and Gen. Schneider.

During the first day of the Church Committee's public hearings, September 16, 1975, William Colby testified that the CIA spent \$3 million from 1952 to 1970 to develop and store a variety of poisons and "delivery systems," a project of the Technical Services Division. One of those "delivery systems," the so-called "microbioinoculator" (electronically-activated dart gun) stole the show. A picture of Senators Frank Church and John Tower inspecting the strange pistol with its telescopic sight appeared on the front page of the next day's *New York Times* and in other papers around the world. It was straight out of James Bond, but probably the device least likely to be used operationally (although it probably was useful for testing the efficacy of various poison darts, as Colby said). Colby testified that the CIA had developed poison darts which could strike a human target without the person's knowledge from a distance of 100 meters and kill him or her silently without the toxin later appearing in an autopsy. (An assassination made to appear to be a natural death is called "dying of the measles" in the CIA.)

Despite the size of the investment and the sophistication of the technology, Colby insisted that none of the toxins had ever been used operationally—except once. In another of those amazing coincidences for which the CIA is so famous, Colby testified that the only operational use was the one that happened to have been reported in the press 15 years earlier: during the U-2 flight over the USSR in May 1960, Francis Gary Powers had carried a poison-impregnated drill bit concealed in a silver dollar. (In his own account, *Operation Overflight*, Powers said that although most U-2 pilots had declined to carry the cyanide pills offered before 1958, they were "fascinated" by the silver dollar, which was routinely offered to each one at departure time.)

According to Harrison E. Salisbury, "the bottom line at the CIA is blackmail, the squeeze, and, if necessary, murder" (*Penthouse*, May 1975). While the Church Committee limited its inquiry narrowly to a handful of attempts on the lives of a few foreign leaders, Salisbury counts "such major (and scandalous) operations as the infamous Phoenix program of political murder in South Vietnam." Operation Phoenix was a mass assassination program which resulted in at least 26,369 deaths of South Vietnamese civilians; from 1968 to 1971 William Colby was its supervisor.

Salisbury noted that two of the CIA's most prized "successes" involved murder—the overthrow of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, and the assassination of Che Guevara in Bolivia. Salvador Allende of Chile should be added to this list. Despite the narrow focus of its investigation, the Church Committee report noted a common thread: "The assassination plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and none of which possessed great political or military strength." In this respect, assassination as a method conforms to what is true of covert action generally.

But there are two specific patterns which are especially worth noting. On the one hand, the CIA tends to resort to assassination plotting when a particular U.S. puppet/client has become a political embarrassment or liability, as in the cases of Trujillo, Diem, Duvalier, and Amin. On the other hand, killing leftist leaders of newly independent or revolutionary countries seems to have been considered especially effective—Mossadegh, Lumumba, Allende, and the attempts on Chou, Sukarno, and Castro.³ (In the typically chauvinistic jargon of the trade, intelligence people refer to these leaders as "George Washingtons" and consider their political bases especially fragile.) The other cases are variants of the latter: Che Guevara, who had become—and still is—a revolutionary symbol for all of Latin America, and General Schneider, who was considered an important obstacle to the plans for the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile. A senior CIA official told Tad Szulc, "We had to be absolutely sure that *all* the military commanders were against Allende—and there were some unconvinced generals. So we had to convince them."

Obviously, then, there are countries today whose leaders may soon come under CIA scrutiny as possible assassination targets if we apply these same criteria. Nicaragua, Grenada, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Iran, Western Sahara, Zimbabwe, and Namibia are the ones that most readily come to mind. One of the few good things about the proposed CIA Charter currently under consideration by Congress is the section that would outlaw assassination as a method of covert action, but with President Carter's current moves to "unleash" the CIA, there is little reason to expect that this law, if passed, will be enforced any better than was Richard Helms's 1972 directive.

1. Apparently Agency policy had been clearer than Helms liked to recall. The man who had been Deputy Chief of the CIA's Program Branch 7 testified before the Church Committee that its written charter had included this language (Church Committee, Final Report, Book IV, p. 129):

"PB/7 will be responsible for assassinations, kidnapping, and such other functions as from time to time may be given it . . . by higher authority."

2. In its Supplementary Report, however, the Church Committee described CIA consideration of a plan to kill an "Asian leader" in 1949 and another against an "East Asian leader" in 1955. (Church Committee, Final Report, Book IV, pp. 132-133.)

3. The older colonial powers freely employed assassination for a third purpose—to eliminate the most uncompromising and visionary leaders of liberation movements or newly independent countries in order to promote others into leadership roles who were considered more pragmatic or less able.

NEWS NOTES

DEPLOYING FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT

On December 27, 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced the nomination by President Carter of Major General Paul X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps, for promotion to Lieutenant General, and concurrently his assignment as Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

The Rapid Deployment Force, which became operational on March 1, will number some 100,000. The Pentagon told the *New York Times* it is "to fight that half war," a plan which would enable the U.S. to wage 1½ wars at one time—a major war in Europe at the same time as a brief, in-and-out war (like Vietnam?) in the Third World.

Kelley, 51, has a long career in the specialized field of paramilitary, commando and other "special operations." As a graduate of the Army Airborne Pathfinder School, the Commando School in Britain, and a former exchange officer in a British Commando force in Singapore, Malaya and Borneo, he brings considerable expertise to the expanding apparatus which the White House, the Pentagon, and the CIA are creating to maintain and extend U.S. influence around the world.

General Kelley is a director on the Board of Control of the U.S. Naval Institute, and is chairman of the editorial board of the Naval Institute Press which, among other materials, publishes a monthly journal, *Proceedings*.

The January 1980 issue included a provocative article by Commander Robert C. Powers titled "Escalation Control." In today's tense international climate, with casual war threats (conventional and nuclear) by high Administration figures, and with the knowledge that has emerged in recent years of the centrality in U.S. global intelligence and military operations of the U.S. Navy (it is known for example that U.S. naval ships landed on the southern coast of Chile with clandestine deliveries of small arms and tanks to the forces that overthrew the Allende government a few days later), the article assumes added significance.



The author sets forth the primary thrust of the doctrine as being the development of what he calls "middle spectrum" forces in international sea lanes (see the diagram and definitions reprinted from the article). The concluding paragraph of the article is especially noteworthy: "The Navy is in a period of self-examination and transition. Its leaders are seeking to maintain naval strength for the immediate future while developing and analyzing long-term options that may be radically different."

Despite the formal disclaimer at the beginning of the journal that the opinions in it "are not to be construed as official" and "do not necessarily reflect the views" of the Department of the Navy or the Naval Institute, the successive presidents and the Board of Control of the Institute have always been among the highest-ranking naval brass in the land. Examine the reprinted material with this in mind.

Figure 1. The Escalation Control Spectrum

Level of Escalation	Definition
Presence	The routine presence of forces to influence allies and others
Deterrence	The routine presence of forces to deter a potential opponent from undesired action
Intervention	The movement of forces to intervene in a specific situation, unopposed by another major power
Confrontation	An opposed intervention short of actual violent conflict
Firing Line	A division between those levels that involve actual conflict at sea between the superpowers and those that do not. Intervention and confrontation may involve proxy conflict ashore, but forces at sea do not engage.
Short Conventional Conflict	A violent conventional conflict of a duration not requiring the movement of reserves or significant logistics forces
Extended Conventional Conflict	A violent conventional conflict of a duration requiring the movement of reserves and/or significant logistic forces
Limited Nuclear War	A violent nuclear conflict which does not target superpower homelands, and is limited by either geography, types of weapons used, or both
Total Nuclear War	A violent nuclear conflict which does target superpower homelands, either in a selected manner or a full exchange
Post Nuclear War	Any level of the escalation ladder, conducted in the environment following total nuclear war

Figure 2. The Escalation Control Spectrum and U. S. Interests

	Presence	Deterrence	Intervention	Confrontation	Short Conventional Conflict	Extended Conventional Conflict	Limited Nuclear War	Total Nuclear War	Post Nuclear War
Homeland, North America (Core Value)								X	X
NATO/Med. Sea							X		
U. S. Petroleum SLOC						X			
NATO Petroleum SLOC						X			
Japan Petroleum SLOC						X			
Israel					X				
Mideast Petroleum					X				
Latin America Objectives				X					
Africa and Indian Ocean Objectives			X						
South Asia Objectives		X							
World Political Objectives	X								

X = Suggests the maximum escalation level which the United States needs in order to defend its interests, based on politics and power relations.
SLOC—sea lines of communication.

Japanese Peace Crane Becomes U.S. Military Intelligence Symbol

All those who thought the Japanese art of paper-folding—*origami*—and the world famous crane which has for centuries been to the Japanese a symbol of long life, happiness, wisdom, and, especially since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of peace, would remain sacrosanct, must now think again.

The 500th U.S. Military Intelligence Group, based at Camp Zama, Japan, looking for a logo to depict what it refers to as its "emerging new image," has adopted the paper crane. As is more often than not the case in the intelligence community, there is a big difference between the public relations image and the actual realities of the work of MI.

In any case, it seems acutely inappropriate for the 500th to take this symbol as its own, particularly when part of the MI mission calls for spying on the lawful activity of the Japanese, to whom the crane is sacred.

Navy Electronic Warfare and Intelligence

Many of the U.S. Navy's special programs, which do not formally exist, are directed by "Electronic Warfare Czar" Rear Admiral Albert A. Gallotta, Jr. Working out of a small office in the Pentagon tagged "OP-944," Gallotta and Vice Admiral Robert Y. Kaufman coordinate the Navy's electronic warfare and crypto activities.

Working with Charles Hoffman from the Naval Research Laboratories, they are analyzing and developing electromagnetic, infrared and electro-optical devices. Over 100 types of sophisticated electronic warfare activities ranging from satellite electronic signal monitoring to anti-radiation missiles are anticipated in the future.

It is significant that Gallotta, who took the key position only a few months ago, succeeds Rear Admiral Eugene S. Ince. Ince's relative, Robert, is a middle-level case officer in the CIA. Consequently, it is not illogical that the Rear Admiral has now stepped up to a new and even more strategic Navy post, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence in another Pentagon office going by the murky code-name of "009-Charlie."

"EXCEPTIONAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYST PROGRAM" MOVES AHEAD

CAIB readers will recall the report in Number 6 (October 1979) about Admiral Stansfield Turner's new program to attract analysts from the various intelligence agencies to the CIA. On February 1, the Director of Central Intelligence announced that nineteen analysts from six other agencies had been chosen to participate in the program.

At a ceremony in the CIA Headquarters, Admiral Turner congratulated them for being picked (by him) to take part in the scheme, which offers funded research and study grants of as long as two years. The stated objective calls for "enriching their skills in ways that will benefit U.S. intelligence."

As we reported previously, Admiral Turner was attempt-

ing to recruit personnel from other agencies in "the Community" to the CIA—a practice which is very much frowned on in government circles. Of the nineteen he chose, six are from the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center, three from the Defense Intelligence Agency, three from the National Security Agency, two from the FBI, and the other five from the intelligence branches of all three military services.

If the thousands of other analysts throughout the intelligence community are wondering what they have to do to move from the normal up to the *exceptional* category, they probably will have to wait two years for another shot. However, few people in Washington anticipate that Admiral Turner will still be the Director in place then.

Newspaper Guild Finally Rejects AIFLD, AID Support


In *CAIB* Number 5 (July-August 1979) we reported on the conflict between the decision of the Executive Board of the Newspaper Guild in favor of accepting grants from AIFLD and AID, and the opposite position taken by a regional Council. At their annual convention, shortly after our report appeared, the 35,000 member union voted not to accept government or corporate funds for international trade union activities, specifically rejecting an AID/AIFLD grant.

Note Regarding the I.R.A.

In our last issue and in this there are articles which make reference, in passing, to "the I.R.A." and, in particular, its activities in Northern Ireland. A number of readers have protested to *CAIB* that there is a considerable difference between the Official I.R.A. and the Provisional I.R.A., and that distinctions should be drawn.

The articles in question have been submitted to *CAIB* by outside journalists, and they have not been altered. We hope to be able to investigate the Northern Ireland situations more fully in the near future, and to have more information on this subject.

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CIA IN ZIMBABWE

By Anton Ferreira and Jonathan Bloch

With the arrest and deportation of the American mercenary Captain William Atkins from Rhodesia recently, the CIA probably has one agent less operating in the country.

Any or all of the estimated 400 American mercenaries fighting in Rhodesia¹ could be agents said by former CIA officer John Stockwell to be operating there, "possibly preparing for a paramilitary operation like Angola."²

The mercenaries in the pay of the Muzorewa regime were one of the main targets of the Patriotic Front at the Lancaster House talks in London.

Atkins' arrest and deportation had the elements of farce which seem to mark all CIA operations. Agence France Presse reported that he pulled a gun when police arrived to arrest him and was taken away bound hand and foot. He had earlier been court-martialled for assault and pointing a weapon at an officer, who Atkins claimed had been tailing him.

The tail on Atkins and his subsequent deportation indicate that Rhodesia's Special Branch thought him too embarrassing to tolerate further—which must have been very embarrassing, given Rhodesia's desperate shortage of trained manpower in the ten-year-old guerrilla war against the Patriotic Front.

Atkins' case, and others, point to the absurdity of the CIA's relationship with the Rhodesian government. Their aims are the same—maintenance of a regime sympathetic to Western interests—but they keep getting in each other's way.

In 1969 two CIA informants—journalist John Nicholson and lawyer Alfred Gallaher—were jailed for economic sabotage. They had sent the CIA information on how Rhodesia was beating sanctions—sanctions which the U.S. was less than vigorous in observing anyway. Their arrest owed more to CIA incompetence than Rhodesian efficiency and soured relations between the U.S. and Rhodesia. The American Consul-in-Charge, Mr. Paul O'Neill Jr., and the Consulate's Political Officer, Mr. Irl Smith,* were both implicated in the incident.³

Less than a month after their trial Nicholson and Gallaher were freed and deported in return for an assurance from the U.S. that it would keep its Consulate in Salisbury open. Ian Smith, then Rhodesian Prime Minister, said at the time he was "more than happy" with this arrangement which lent his regime U.S. recognition.⁴

*Irl W. Smith was, indeed, the CIA Chief of Station in Salisbury from June 1968 to April 1970. See "Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa," pp. 461-462. [Editor's note.]

Richard Helms, then Director of the CIA, was also happy: "We have useful and workable relationships in Salisbury with our counterparts there. I think it would be a shame to sacrifice those if we didn't have to . . . if we got rid of the Consulate in Salisbury, we would have to run our operations out of some other context . . . I would like to see us keep a hand in there."⁵

But in March the same year President Nixon yielded to pressure from Britain and the OAU and closed the Consulate, going back on his deal with Smith. The CIA used "other contexts" for their operations—mercenaries.⁶

The Rhodesian military is heavily dependent on mercenary power—or what it calls "foreign soldiers"—and actively recruits them worldwide. The *Washington Post* has reported there were 400 U.S. mercenaries in the Rhodesian Army and the *Los Angeles Times* reported 200 mercenaries of all nationalities. ZANU estimates that 50% of the white forces are mercenary.⁷

Most of the U.S. mercenaries, according to evidence presented by ZANU, are recruited with the assistance and approval of the U.S. Army and the CIA through the mercenary magazine *Soldier of Fortune*, owned and edited by Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Brown of the 12th Special Forces Group (Airborne) U.S. Army Reserve. Another staffer on *Soldier of Fortune*, George Bacon, was killed while fighting as a mercenary in Angola and is acknowledged by the magazine to have been a CIA operative.⁸ *Soldier of Fortune* regularly carries articles on the war in Rhodesia with comprehensive details on how to enlist on the Government side.

Another source of mercenary recruits is the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, D.C., which supplies applicants with recruiting brochures and the address of the recruiting officer in Salisbury.

One of the earliest reported instances of CIA involvement in Rhodesia was documented by Ted Braden, a former Vietnam Green Beret, who said the Agency financed the training of Congo mercenaries by the Rhodesian Light Infantry.⁹

Since then the CIA, shaken by unfavorable publicity in the U.S., has pulled in its horns—it neglected to produce an in-depth study of Rhodesia last spring to avoid political controversy.¹⁰

According to Sean Gervasi, consultant to the Rhodesian Sanctions Committee at the UN, CIA help to Rhodesia could include the supply of sophisticated arms like the planes and helicopters used in raids on Zambia and Mozambique. An American company, Air Associates of Skokie, Illinois, acted as middlemen in last year's sale of Bell



205 gunships from the Israeli defense force to Rhodesia. Air Associates obtained an export license from the U.S. Government, and Gervasi believes it unlikely American intelligence did not know where the arms were going.¹¹

But Rhodesia, after its experience of U.S. dealings in the Nicholson/Gallaher spy deal, is wary of America's motives. According to Bruce Oudes, writing in *Africa Report* of July 1974, "Rhodesian security, obsessed with the possibility that the CIA might have agents operating in the country, scrutinizes particularly closely all whites who enter the country for any purpose except short term tourism".¹² Since then Carter has replaced Nixon and Rhodesian security can be expected to be more suspicious. —

1. The *Washington Post*, December 9, 1979.
2. *Peoples News Service*, March 6, 1979.
3. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), January 4 and 11, 1970.
4. The *Times* (London), February 4, 1970.
5. "U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa," edited by the Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, Boston: South End Press, 1978.
6. The *Guardian* (London), March 9, 1970.
7. "Guns for Hire," edited by ZANU Support Committee, New York, AAM.
8. *Soldier of Fortune*, Fall 1976.
9. *Ramparts*, Oct. 1967.
10. *8 Days*, August 11, 1979.
11. *New African*, August 1979.
12. *Africa Report*, July/August 1974.

Espionage Recruiting Time

by Gary Brown
and Louis Wolf

"The next time someone tells you that Turner is the stupid bastard who cut the size of the Agency out here, look at the color of his hair. . . . This is a young man's game. . . . You don't run a good, strong paramilitary or covert action program with a bunch of 55-year-olds. . . . What I've done is cut out high-grade superstructure . . . and doubled the input into the clandestine services . . . so that we have a group of young tigers. . . ."

This is the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner speaking recently, (*Washington Star*, February 5, 1980). Contentious though he is, even to many who work for him, probably no one is going to call him stupid. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the intelligence "czar" (as he is known in Washington because he oversees not just the CIA, but the entire intelligence "community" in which there is considerable rivalry) is growing increasingly desperate in his search for young, ripe talent to staff the various spy agencies.

This trend was evidenced most recently by an all-day seminar last November at, of all places, the Central Florida Career Institute in Orlando. Billed as the first seminar in the country to give career information about the intelligence profession, the meeting was attended by 150 juniors, seniors and graduate students at central Florida universities and colleges (325 were expected). The subsidized \$1 registration fee included a box lunch, two "energy breaks," entrance to the various sessions, and a stack of recruitment propaganda from the CIA, DIA, the National Security Agency, the various military intelligence branches, and the FBI.

The program was sponsored by the Edyth Bush Charitable Foundation, Inc. Hugh F. McKean, a former CIA operative and by now a member of the Foundation's Board of Directors, was the initiator of the conference. He told those attending that he had invited his friends from the intelligence community (past and present) as seminar speakers and faculty. And they came.

Charles M. Balyeat, now an instructor at the CIA School of Management; Dr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, former CIA Inspector General and now a political science professor at Brown University; Dr. Sayre Stevens, former CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology; Dr. Edwin E. Speaker, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency Wea-

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pons and Systems Division; Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson (retired), former DIA director; Major Larry M. Tucker, currently chairperson for Strategic Intelligence Studies at the Defense Intelligence School; Capt. Richard W. Bates (retired), DIS commandant until last year and currently vice-president of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers; FBI Special Agent John M. Kelso, Jr.; and Ray S. Cline, longtime officer in the OSS, CIA, and State Department Intelligence division, now executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and also president of the National Intelligence Study Center.

Such a heavyweight group of gentlemen could hardly be expected to go out of their way to be either honest or objective about the nature of intelligence work. The speakers collectively reduced the intelligence community's operations to a baseline level of "problem-solving" and "technical expertise" as each of them outlined the purpose and direction of the various intelligence organizations.

CIA Gets "D-Minus" on Iran

For example, this ideology of technical necessity was behind former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Ray Cline's assessment of U.S. involvement in Iran as a "D-minus," blaming President Carter for not giving the CIA a freer hand "to operate clandestinely" there. He conveniently avoided mentioning that the CIA had, in the view of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, "historically considered itself the Shah's booster," that 75 to 100 operators the CIA had in residence in Tehran prior to the Shah's fall from power really had no independent gauge of what was happening because of the Agency's hand-in-glove relationship in Iran and in the U.S. with the Shah's brutal SAVAK network. Cline's "D-minus" might better

be understood in the context of the more honest statement by a CIA person: "... we can't do much with opaque regimes headed by friendly authoritarian figures." (*Washington Post*, December 12, 1978).

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick long sat in the CIA Inspector General's chair and, even after having softened the official report of the events surrounding the suicide-death of Dr. Frank Olson in the Agency's *MKNAOMILSD* and poison experiments, was promoted to a more senior position at the Agency. The professor asserted confidently to the assembled potential espionage recruits that the CIA's organizing of Montagnard tribespeople against the Vietnamese revolutionary forces had been "successful," and that his only regret with the CIA's Bay of Pigs assault on Cuba is that "unhappily it failed." He also proceeded to justify the CIA's massive illegal domestic spying program, *Operation CHAOS*. While admitting that *CHAOS* is an example of an operation that was "on the verge of constitutionality," he claimed that the Department of State found the operation to be "strictly legal."

Those students who came to the meeting were typified by the comment of one who said: "I've probably watched every FBI show there ever was on television, and I wanted to know more about it." Perhaps they would do well to heed what one still active covert action intelligence veteran told *Newsweek*: "I am forever overwhelmed by the number of very fine people who have been deluded into wasting their lives in this business."

Nevertheless, Admiral Turner and friends continue to go after more "young tigers."

Gary Brown is an instructor in English at the University of Central Florida and a free-lance journalist.

CENTRAL FLORIDA CAREER INSTITUTE

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"CAREERS IN INTELLIGENCE"
Saturday, November 17, 1979
9:00 A.M. -- 5:00 P.M.

Edyth Bush Theatre
Princeton Street at 17-92 (Mills Ave.)
Orlando, Florida

8:30 A.M. -- Registration. (Doors Close Promptly at 9:00 A.M.)

9:00 A.M. -- Welcome and Statement of Purpose:

Mr. David R. Roberts, President
Edyth Bush Charitable Foundation, Inc.

Dr. Hugh F. McKean, Member, Board of Directors
Edyth Bush Charitable Foundation, Inc.

Captain R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.), Moderator of
the Meeting; President, National Military
Intelligence Association

9:15 A.M. -- Careers in Intelligence I - Non-Defense Agencies:

Dr. Ray S. Cline, Executive Director,
Georgetown University Center for
Strategic Studies.

10:00 A.M. -- Refreshments (in Lobby).

10:15 A.M. -- Careers in Intelligence II - Defense Department and
Armed Services:

Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, USA (Ret.)
Formerly--Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

11:00 A.M. -- Science and Technology in Intelligence

Dr. Sayre Stevens, Formerly--Deputy Director
for Science & Technology, Central
Intelligence Agency.

11:45 A.M. -- Lunch - Lobby and Grounds (weather permitting)
to

1:00 P.M. -- Reconvene in Theatre.

1:00 P.M. -- Intelligence Operations

Dr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Professor of
Political Science, Brown University

1:45 P.M. -- PARALLEL CONFERENCES: (Discussion Leader and Questions)

(Theatre)	(Tupperware)
<u>Intelligence Careers I:</u> (Non-Defense Agencies) Mr. Charles M. Balyeat, Instructor, School of Management, Central Intelligence Agency.	<u>Science and Technology in Intelligence:</u> Dr. Edwin E. Speaker, Head, Weapons & Systems Division, Defense Intelligence Agency.

2:45 P.M. -- Refreshments (Lobby)

3:00 P.M. -- PARALLEL CONFERENCES: (Discussion Leader and Questions)

(Theatre)	(Tupperware)
<u>Intelligence Operations:</u> John M. Kelso, Jr., Esq., Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation	<u>Intelligence Careers II:</u> (Defense Agencies and Armed Services) MaJ. Larry M. Tucker, USAF, Professor of Intelligence, Defense Intelligence School

4:00 P.M. -- General Session -- Panel of Faculty -- Written
Questions (and questions from the floor if time permits).

5:00 P.M. -- Adjournment.

-2-

Former Head of MI-6 Commands Northern Ireland Troops

by Phil Kelly

Sir Maurice Oldfield, 64, given command of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, by Edward Heath, retired by Harold Wilson, is to sit in Stormont to "sandpaper down the edges" between the British Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, as a Northern Ireland Office person put it.

The creation of Oldfield's new post as security co-ordinator represents the death of the formal facade of "Ulsterisation." If it ever had any meaning, this was an attempt to follow the counter-insurgency text books and make the police force, and police methods, the primary means of enforcing law and order. It never worked, and lately, the British Army's frustration with even the marginal extension in the RUC's role which came with Ulsterisation has spilled over into the British press.

In demanding from a Tory Government that they should again be recognised as the main security force, the Army were pushing against an open door. As they wished, they are now back in undisputed control, able to clear proposed operations directly with the security co-ordinator.

The choice of the man to fill the post has fallen on Oldfield. MI6, which he headed between 1972 and 1975, is Britain's equivalent of the CIA. He is a career spook, and has experience in counter-insurgency. From 1950 to 1952, and from 1956 to 1958, he was based in Singapore. During the Malayan "emergency," his role was the co-ordination of MI6 activity with Army, Special Branch, and police operations.

Like the CIA, MI6 concerns itself principally with foreign espionage. Like the CIA, it is not only an intelligence gathering organization, but a means of covertly interfering in the political affairs of other countries. MI6, though, is smaller, poorer, and more sophisticated. It does not have the capacity to mount on its own the counter-insurgency operations which the CIA staged single-handed in Latin America and South East Asia, providing troops, weapons, and even air support. MI6's military capacity is often provided by the Special Air Service Regiment, the SAS: memoirs of officers who fought in Oman and Yemen bear this out. It is closer to the Foreign Office than the CIA is to the State Department: for example, British media operations, on the lines of the CIA's disinformation efforts and control of journals, were run through the Foreign Office Information Research Department. Oldfield knows the liaison game backwards.

But he has another resource to draw on: his close friendship with leading members and ex-members of the CIA. As the British media have ceaselessly reminded us, Oldfield is one of the models for John Le Carre's fictional George Smiley—the man who rooted out the "moles" inside MI6. How much mole-rooting Oldfield actually did doesn't really matter. Crucially, he was Chief of the MI6 station in

Washington between 1960 and 1964, and did a great deal to rebuild the trust of the Americans in the British intelligence establishment after the Burgess, Maclean and Philby debacle. He still has a great number of friends in the U.S. intelligence community.

How then, will he spend his time when not forcing British soldiers and Ulster policemen to talk to each other?

Britain's urgent need now is to counter the pressure building up in the international community that after ten years of war, it is time for movement, a "political initiative." This comes from many who have no sympathy for the IRA; but from the British point of view, such pressure serves to re-inforce IRA morale.

Current targets for covert action are those political forces which do not whole-heartedly endorse British policy of going for a military victory before any political initiative.

In Ireland, recent MI6 action has been aimed not directly at the IRA, but at isolating it and strengthening opposition to it. MI6 was behind the bank robberies conducted by the Littlejohn brothers to discredit the IRA. MI6 case officer John Wyman tried to bribe his way into the Garda Special Branch. MI6 planning may have been behind the Dublin bombs which encouraged the Dail to strengthen repressive measures in Ireland. Understandably, many people feel that if the British Government were going to increase covert action against the IRA, they wouldn't announce the appointment of a man like Oldfield, for the IRA would instantly reinforce their vigilance against infiltrators. As the IRA aren't the immediate target, and as the real targets won't be expecting it, these objections are not so substantial.

It is probably in the United States that the major British effort will come. That establishment politicians like New York Governor Hugh Carey and Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy are unhappy about British policies causes more concern than the IRA's backing from liberation movements and the international ultra-left. It is significant that another principle contender for the Oldfield job was Sir John Killick, Britain's Ambassador to NATO, who spends most of his time liaising with the U.S. military and intelligence establishments. The CIA and the intelligence community play a massive role in shaping U.S. national policy, and there is no doubt that Oldfield will be seeking help from his friends there to oppose Teddy Kennedy, and to remind the U.S. administration that political initiatives must follow, not precede, military victory. George Bush, a former CIA Director, is one of the front-runners for the Republican nomination. Of course, British pressure will start with lobbying and discrete persuasion. But if Teddy Kennedy looks close to the White House, and cannot be persuaded to end his criticism of British policies over Ireland, then MI6 may have dirty tricks up its sleeves.

NAMING NAMES

This column remains a regular feature of *CAIB* despite increasing efforts to attempt to make it illegal. Since the material presented here is researched from public documents, we have always maintained that it would be unconstitutional to criminalize this sort of research. We have been joined in this sentiment by such unlikely allies as the Justice Department and Senator Moynihan, as discussed elsewhere in this issue.

In any event, we have been able to conduct considerable research in this field since the last *Bulletin*, and the results are presented here. We have uncovered sixteen Chiefs of Station, including such significant posts as Chile, China, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. In addition, we present information on twenty-three other senior CIA officers.

Bahrain

John F. Purinton, located at the Manama, Bahrain Embassy as of September 1979, appears to be a former telecommunications officer who has moved up to a case officer slot. Purinton, born June 29, 1938, was a telecommunications technician at the New Delhi, India Embassy from 1971 until at least 1974. In July 1976 he was serving in Karachi, Pakistan, apparently still in a telecommunications slot, but his cover in Manama is now as an economic officer.

Belgium

The new Chief of Station for Belgium is **James Lawrence Corrigan**, who has been transferred, as of November 1979, from Yaounde, Cameroon to the Brussels Embassy. Corrigan is fairly well known as a CIA officer; his biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*, *Dirty Work 2*, and *Bulletin* Number 4. Corrigan served from 1974 to 1977 in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador in Paris, and as of October 1977 was transferred to Yaounde, in which posting he was promoted to Chief of Station. As of November 1979 he is found at the Brussels Embassy.

Cameroon

Corrigan has been replaced in Yaounde, Cameroon as Chief of Station by **Richard Joseph Cornish**, born November 7, 1925 in Nebraska. Cornish's State Department biography includes the tell-tale service as a Department of the Army "political officer" from 1949 to 1959, indicating that he entered the CIA over thirty years ago, upon gradua-


tion from Yale University (by far the favored school, in the early days of the Agency). He served as a political officer in Rangoon, Burma from 1959 to 1962, when he was transferred back to Headquarters until 1964, when he was posted to Lome, Togo, again as a political officer. In 1966 he returned again to Headquarters, and there are no State Department entries regarding his subsequent service over the next 13 years. As of January 1980, however, he reappeared, at the Yaounde Embassy, where, considering his seniority, he clearly is Chief of Station.

Chad

The new Chief of Station in N'djamena, Chad, replacing James L. Atwater, is **Larry G. Jarrett**, born September 3, 1939. Jarrett, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 2*, served in the early 1970s in Sweden and Zambia. From 1974 until 1977 he was at the Lagos, Nigeria Embassy, as an economic-commercial officer—in fact Deputy Chief of Station—returning to Headquarters late in 1977, where he apparently remained till his posting, as of January 1980, to Chad.

Chile

We are pleased to uncover a powerful quartet of Agency officers in Santiago, Chile, including the new Chief of Station, the Deputy Chief, and two case officers.



The new Chief of Station is **Thomas J. Keenan**, born June 29, 1930 in Wisconsin. Keenan, whose biography is found in *Dirty Work 1*, served in Mexico City from 1960 to 1964, and under Department of the Army cover from 1964 to 1966, when his name disappears from State Department records for a year. In 1967 he was undercover as a political officer in Bogota, Colombia, where he remained until transferred to Lima, Peru in 1971. From 1973 to 1975 he served as Chief of Station in Kingston, Jamaica, before returning for a stint at Headquarters. *CAIB*'s sources in Chile have located him at the Santiago Embassy as of December 1979.

Keenan's Deputy Chief appears to be **Clifton J. Schaefer**, born December 24, 1937, who, our sources in Chile indicate, has been serving there since late 1978. Schaefer served in Mexico City from 1969 to 1970, when he was transferred to Tegucigalpa, Honduras. After two years in Honduras he was transferred to Buenos Aires, Argentina, where he served until at least late 1975. There are no entries regarding him in Department of State records from then until mid-1978, when he appears back at CIA Headquarters. As of October 1978 he was serving at the Santiago Embassy, and, our sources indicate, since at least December of 1979 his cover has been in the political section.

Two senior case officers serving under Keenan and Schaefer are **Frederick W. Silva**, born February 22, 1937 in Massachusetts, and **Todd D. Hagenah**, born July 20, 1940 in New York. Silva's records include the phoney "research analyst" post with the Department of Defense from 1966 to 1969, followed by diplomatic cover posting to Guatemala City in March 1969, as a political assistant. In May 1971 he was transferred to Guayaquil, Ecuador as a political officer, until returning to Headquarters in July 1973. In October 1975, records indicate, he was posted to Bogota, and as of November 1978 he was in Santiago. Sources in Santiago indicate that, at least as of December 1979, he is in the political section.

Hagenah joined the CIA in 1965, and went under diplomatic cover, also in Ecuador, serving as a political officer at the Quito Embassy from late 1971 till mid-1974, when he was transferred to Lima, this time as a consular officer. We have been unable to find any Department of State references to him from 1976 to 1978, but he too appears in Santiago in late 1978 and, our sources tell us, is found in the economic section.

China

CAIB has located the Chief of Station in Beijing (Peking), **China**. He is **David D. Gries**, born May 8, 1932 in Ohio. Gries, another Yale graduate, was under cover as an "analyst" for the Department of the Air Force from 1960 to 1962, before appearing under State Department cover as a Chinese language and area trainee at the Foreign Service Institute Field Language School in Taichung, Taiwan. In 1964 he was transferred to the Singapore Consulate General as a political officer, serving there till 1968, when he returned to Headquarters. There are no ascertainable references to him in State Department records from 1970 to 1978. Then,

as of July 1978, he was at the then U.S. Interests Section (now the Embassy) in Beijing, where he is undoubtedly the Chief of Station.

Denmark

The Chief of Station in Copenhagen, **Denmark**, is **Clark Gilbert Myers**, born May 8, 1930 in Massachusetts. Myers served in Department of the Army cover from 1956 to 1964, when he assumed diplomatic cover at the Department of State. In 1965 he was posted to the Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany Embassy; a year later he was transferred to Moscow. In 1968 he returned to Headquarters, and in 1971 emerged as a political officer at the Saigon, Vietnam Embassy. In 1973 records show he was back at Langley, and there are no records of his whereabouts from early 1974 until January 1979, when he appeared on the Copenhagen Diplomatic List.

A case officer discovered at the Copenhagen, **Denmark** Embassy is **John J. Arends, Jr.**, born October 21, 1937 in Michigan. Arends served in Vienna from 1968 to 1973, and then, after a year back at Headquarters, in Geneva until at least 1977. After a two-year absence from State Department records, he appears, posted to Copenhagen, as of at least August 1979.

Egypt

Murat Natirboff, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1* and in *Dirty Work 2*, clearly a specialist on north-east Africa, former Chief of Station in Sudan and in Kenya, is now the new Chief of Station in Cairo, **Egypt**. Natirboff, born February 4, 1921 in the Soviet Union, and naturalized in the U.S. in 1943, has been in the CIA since at least 1952, when, the records say, he was a "training officer" with the Department of the Army, a cover he held until 1960. That year he was posted to New Delhi, India, under cover of the International Cooperation Administration. In 1961 he was transferred to Jakarta, Indonesia, still under cover of that agency's successor, the Agency for International Development. There are no State Department records on Natirboff from 1964 to 1972, when he was posted, under State Department cover, as a political officer in Khartoum, but in fact Chief of Station. From 1975 to 1976 he was back at Headquarters, and then was posted to Nairobi, again as Chief of Station. Sources have confirmed that he has been posted to the Embassy in Cairo since at least December 1979.

Ethiopia


A middle-level case officer has been spotted with the Addis Ababa, **Ethiopia** Embassy. He is **David A. Harper**, born March 12, 1942. Harper served as a political assistant in Copenhagen from 1970 to 1972, when he returned to Headquarters for two years. His activities in Denmark were exposed in the book "Under Cover," the relevant portion of which was reprinted in *Bulletin* Number 5. In May of 1974 Harper was posted to Bujumbura, Burundi, where he spent approximately three years before returning

once again to Headquarters. In July 1979 he was transferred to the Addis Ababa Embassy, although his precise cover title is not known to *CAIB*.

Ghana

Last year's change of government in **Ghana** has apparently generated some shuffling of CIA personnel. We have located two case officers there as of at least late 1979.

One is **Jane Bryan Hoerrner**, born July 19, 1942 in New Jersey. State Department records indicate that she was under cover as an "economic assistant" with the Department of the Army from 1967 to 1973, when she first appeared under diplomatic cover as an economic-commercial officer at the Addis Ababa Embassy. She returned to Headquarters in late 1975, and no further records have been found until our source Accra said that as of October 1979, she was posted to the economic section at the Accra Embassy. Her biography is found in *Dirty Work 2*.



The other case officer in Ghana is **Kenneth Leroy Hurley**, whose biography also appears in *Dirty Work 2*. Hurley was under cover at the Embassy at Lusaka, Zambia from 1974 to 1978, when he was transferred to Blantyre, Malawi, where he served as Chief of Base until at least early 1979. As of August 1979, however, he appeared in Accra, where he might be Deputy Chief of Station.

Guinea

Adrian Bernard Ciazza, born December 10, 1932, in Alabama, is the new Chief of Station in Conakry, **Guinea**. Ciazza, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*, has been with the CIA since at least 1957, when he commenced eight years under cover as a "research analyst" with the Department of the Army. He served as a political officer in Kabul, Afghanistan from 1965 to 1968, when he returned for a stint at Headquarters, before a posting, in April 1971, to Colombo, Sri Lanka. He returned to Headquarters in 1973 and went to Tehran, Iran in 1974, for a brief period. After less than a year back at Headquarters again, he was posted in late 1975 to the Brussels, Belgium Embassy. The next references to him indicate that as of September 1979 he was in Conakry, undoubtedly, given his length of service, the Chief of Station.

India

Allan Bruce Hemmings, whose biography is found in *Dirty Work 2*, is a case officer who has been transferred to

the Consulate General in Calcutta, **India**. Hemmings served as a consular officer in Casablanca, Morocco from 1975 to 1977, when he was transferred to Algiers, Algeria, as Third Secretary. He was in Algiers at least as late as February 1979, but recent records indicate that as of November 1979 he was in Calcutta.

Indonesia

We have located the Chief of Station and three other case officers in **Indonesia**. The Chief is **Carl Edward Gebhardt**, born June 8, 1933, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*. There are no available records on Gebhardt prior to 1972, when, after a few months at Headquarters, he was posted to Warsaw, Poland. In 1974 he returned to Headquarters for about a year and a half, and was then assigned to Bangkok, Thailand, in July 1976. *CAIB* has located references to Gebhardt indicating that at least as of November 1978 he was posted to Jakarta, Indonesia, where he is believed to be the Chief of Station.

The three case officers working for Gebhardt are **James D. Anders, Jr.**, **Ronald M. Cinal**, and **William H. Wright**. Anders, born March 4, 1942 in Texas, was under cover as an "area specialist" for the Department of the Army from 1968 to 1973, when he took diplomatic cover as an economic-commercial officer at the Vientiane, Laos Embassy. In 1975 he returned to Headquarters and disappeared from State Department records until August 1979, when he was posted to the economic section at the Jakarta Embassy.

Cinal, who is listed in *Dirty Work 2*, was under cover as a political officer in the Nairobi, Kenya Embassy during 1976 and 1977. He reappears as of at least December 1979, as a political officer in Jakarta.

William H. Wright, born September 6, 1939 in Kansas, was posted to Rangoon, Burma from 1964 to 1970, when he was transferred to Manila, Philippines. In 1973 he returned to Headquarters; no additional records are found until he is shown, as of August 1977, at the Surabaya, Indonesia Consulate. As of October 1979 he was transferred to the capital.

Japan

The Chief of Base at the Consulate General in Osaka-Kobe, **Japan** is **Lucius H. Horiuchi**, born July 22, 1928 in Washington. Horiuchi is an Agency veteran, having served under cover as a Department of the Army "analyst" from 1951 to 1965. In July 1965 he was posted to Manila as a political officer, returning to Headquarters in 1967. Following a promotion to GS-13 in October of 1967, and his appointment as a "coordination officer" in May 1968, there are no records referring to him for the next ten years. In May of 1978 he is shown back at CIA Headquarters, and, in July of that year he was posted to Osaka-Kobe, undoubtedly as Chief of Base.

A senior case officer in Tokyo is **Walter I. Floyd, Jr.**, born April 4, 1939 in Pennsylvania. Floyd also served in

the ubiquitous position of "research analyst" for the Department of the Air Force from 1965 to 1970, before entering into diplomatic posting, in 1971, first to Yokahama for language training, and then to the Tokyo Embassy, as a political officer. He served in Japan until 1976, when he returned to Headquarters, and then disappeared from State Department records. As of at least August 1979 he reappears as First Secretary in the Tokyo Embassy.

Jordan

A senior telecommunications officer in Amman, **Jordan** is **Donald Charles McClung**. McClung served in Montevideo, Uruguay from 1975 to 1977, when he was transferred to Athens, Greece. As of October 1979 he is found in Amman, in telecommunications.

Lebanon

The person who appears to be the new Chief of Station in Beirut, **Lebanon** is **Jack S. Ogino**, born October 9, 1935 in California. Ogino, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*, served in Cairo from 1965 to 1967, when he returned to Headquarters; in Kathmandu, Nepal from 1969 to 1972; and in Madras, India from 1972 to 1974, before returning again to Headquarters. In 1976 he was First Secretary at the Colombo, Sri Lanka Embassy, and, at least as of September 1979, our sources indicate that he has been posted to Beirut, where he is believed to be the Chief of Station.

Liberia

The new telecommunications chief in Monrovia, **Liberia**, the Agency's central telecommunications relay base for all of Africa, is **Donald L. Miller**, who has replaced Marvin H. Chindgren, who was listed in *Bulletin* Number 4. Miller apparently arrived in Monrovia at least as of September 1979. The new deputy telecommunications chief appears to be **Dan N. Stephenson**, who has replaced Richard B. George, also listed in *Bulletin* Number 4. Stephenson served at the major telecommunications installation in Manila, Philippines from 1965 to 1972, with a year during that period at Headquarters. No records regarding his whereabouts between 1972 and now have been found. Sources in Monrovia indicate that he also arrived in Liberia in September 1979.

New Zealand

The CIA Chief of Station in Wellington, **New Zealand** appears to be **Hugh Richard Waters**, born September 17, 1929 in New York. Waters served as an "analyst" with the Department of the Air Force from 1958 to 1960, when he moved into diplomatic cover, posted to the Seoul, South Korea Embassy. In 1965 he was back briefly at Headquarters, before being transferred to Surabaya, Indonesia, as a political officer, and, in fact, Chief of Base at the Consulate there. In 1967 he returned home again for two years, and

was then posted to the Rawalpindi, Pakistan Embassy, where he served as Deputy Chief of Station. From 1972 to 1979, State Department records are silent as to his whereabouts, but Waters appears on the April 1979 Wellington Diplomatic List as Attache, but in fact Chief of Station.

Paraguay

The Chief of Station in Asuncion, **Paraguay**, the longest-lived dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere, is **Donald J. Venute**, born April 5, 1930 in New Jersey. Venute has been with the CIA since 1951, when he graduated from Georgetown University. He spent his first ten years under military cover, and, in July 1961, appeared as Third Secretary at the Mogadiscio, Somalia Embassy. He returned to Department of the Army cover from 1966 to 1967, and then reverted to diplomatic cover, as a political officer in the Lima, Peru Embassy. In 1972 he returned to Headquarters, and disappeared from State Department records. In July 1978 he resurfaced, listed in the Asuncion Diplomatic List as Attache. He is clearly the Chief of Station.

Portugal

A Lisbon, **Portugal** source confirms that as of November 1979, **Edward J. Bash, Jr.**, a case officer, appeared posted to the Embassy there, in the economic section.

Senegal

Case officer **Robert J. Hammond, Jr.**, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 2*, has been transferred to the political section at the Dakar, **Senegal** Embassy, as of August 1979. Hammond served as political officer in Accra, Ghana from June 1975 until February 1978, when he was returned to Headquarters. After about a year and a half, apparently, he is back in Africa.

Switzerland

European specialist **Rowland E. Roberts, Jr.**, appears to be the new Chief of Base in the extremely important post of Geneva, **Switzerland**. Roberts, born May 8, 1928 in Pennsylvania, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 1*, has been with the CIA since at least 1954, when he commenced military cover as a "plans officer" with the Department of the Army. After eight years in that role, he served five years as political officer in the Copenhagen, Denmark Embassy, returned to Headquarters for several years, and then served at the Antwerp, Belgium Consulate General as an economic-commercial officer. In 1975 he returned to Headquarters again, and as of October 1979 is found at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.


Togo

Gordon Joseph Hopman, born October 4, 1941 in Oregon, listed in *Dirty Work 2*, has just been transferred to the Lome, **Togo** Embassy where he is apparently Chief of

Station. Hopman served from 1971 to 1974 as a "program analyst" for the Department of the Army, before his first diplomatic posting, as political officer in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. In 1976 he was transferred to Kinshasa, Zaire, and, as of December 1979 he is found at the Lome Embassy.

Turkey

We have uncovered two case officers in Turkey, **S. Phillips L. Amerman** and **Patrick N. Murphy**. Amerman, born September 14, 1945 in Pennsylvania, was an administrative officer with the Department of the Air Force from 1969 to 1971. Then, after a year at the University of Istanbul, he appeared as a projects officer with the Department of State, and, in 1973, became a consular officer at the Istanbul, Turkey Consulate General. We are unclear whether he remained in Turkey all the intervening time, but as of October 1979 he appeared at the Ankara Embassy.



Murphy, born September 28, 1941 in West Virginia, is presented in State Department records as a computer manager for the Department of the Air Force from 1968 to 1970, when he received State Department language training. In August 1971 he appeared as a consular officer at the Istanbul Consulate General, and in 1973 was transferred to Ankara. He was back at Headquarters in 1976, posted to the Rome, Italy Embassy in 1977, and, as of August 1979, is found once more at the Istanbul Consulate General.

In the light of recent developments in Turkey, with massive repression of people in the streets which has been graphically shown in the American media, these case officers are doubtless busy working in close liaison with the Turkish secret police.

U.S.S.R.

The CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, U.S.S.R. appears to be **Burton Lee Gerber**, born July 19, 1933 in Illinois. Gerber has been with the Agency since 1955, when he began military cover as an "area analyst" with the Department of the Army, a position he held until 1965, with one year, 1956, supposedly as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Army. In July 1965 he commenced diplomatic cover, studying Bulgarian at the Foreign Service Institute, preparatory to his posting, in June 1966, as "political officer" in the Sofia, Bulgaria Embassy. He was at that time either Chief of Station for Bulgaria, or Deputy. In October 1968 he returned to Headquarters. No further foreign postings appear in State Department records until October 1976, when Gerber was found at the Belgrade, Yugoslavia Embassy,

apparently Chief of Station. As of November 1979, at least, our information indicates he was assigned to the Moscow Embassy, where he is Chief of Station.

United Arab Emirates

The new Chief of Station in Abu Dhabi, **United Arab Emirates** is **Thomas D. Hawbaker**, whose biography appears in *Dirty Work 2*. Hawbaker, born February 28, 1932 in Iowa, served in Jordan from 1964 to 1966 under cover of the Agency for International Development, in Vietnam from 1966 to 1969—as a "pacification advisor" for the Department of the Air Force—under State Department cover in Cairo from 1969 to 1973, and in Colombo, Sri Lanka, from 1973 until at least late 1975. There are no indications of his whereabouts from 1975 until 1979, when in November he appears posted to Abu Dhabi.


United Kingdom

Edward William Proctor, who replaced the inimitable Cord Meyer, Jr. as Chief of Station in London, **United Kingdom**, in late 1976, has very possibly retired, but in any event has left London and been replaced by **Richard F. Stolz, Jr.** Stolz, born November 27, 1925 in Ohio, has reached this high and prestigious CIA post after 30 years with the Agency. His career began under cover as a "political affairs officer" with the Department of the Army in 1950. In 1959 he switched to diplomatic cover as a political officer in the Frankfurt, Federal Republic of Germany Consulate General. (Observers have noted that the Frankfurt Base is, in fact, much larger and more important than the Bonn Station.) In 1960 Stolz was transferred to Sofia, Bulgaria where he remained till 1962, when he returned to Headquarters, as an intelligence operations specialist. In 1964 he was posted to Moscow; in 1965 he returned to Langley; and in 1966 he began a three-year stint in Rome, again as a political officer. In 1969 he was back at Headquarters; and in 1973 he was sent to the Belgrade, Yugoslavia Embassy as Chief of Station. In late 1974 he returned home, and there are no entries in Department of State records until December 1979, when he surfaced on the London Diplomatic List as Political Attache—and, in fact, Chief of Station.

The new telecommunications chief at the London Station is **Thomas C. Shedd**, born June 15, 1931 in Massachusetts. Shedd has served in the telecommunications specialty in Tokyo, Accra, and London—where records indicate he served from 1969 to 1972, prior to his current tour, which commenced at least as of October 1979. Shedd replaces James Smith in the position he held since mid-1975.

Yugoslavia

The new Chief of Station in **Yugoslavia** appears to be **Peter Vroom Raudenbush**, born August 13, 1935 in Minnesota. He was under cover as an "analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1962 to 1973, when he first appeared in State Department records, posted to Conakry, Guinea as a consular officer, but, in fact, Chief of Station. In 1975 he returned to Headquarters, and, as of September 1979 is found at the Belgrade Embassy.



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Sources and Methods

By Ken Lawrence

CIA ASSASSINATIONS

On March 6, 1972, CIA Director Richard Helms sent a memo to his deputy directors which read, in part:

It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel. . . .¹

A year later when "a high-level official" made just such a suggestion to his subordinates in Uganda, the Chief of Station in Kampala demanded he put it in writing. The suggestion to "get rid of this guy" (Idi Amin) was then quickly withdrawn with the statement, "Of course I was only kidding."

"That's how it can happen, I thought," recalled former CIA agent Jay Mullen (*Oregon Magazine*, June 1979). "How many operations have resulted from similar Thomas à Becket statements? And how many men who assumed they were told to act could not later document their instructions?"

Perhaps it was knowledge of this or similar incidents that prompted Helms's successor, William Colby, to give CBS

reporter Daniel Schorr a different date for the supposed abolition of the tactic:

Without confirming anything about the past, Colby nevertheless wanted me to know that assassination was not currently a method used by the CIA. It had been banned since 1973. . . . (*Clearing the Air*, page 146.)

Colby's own directive against CIA employment of assassination was issued on August 8, 1973. If reports in the Cuban press are accurate, Colby's order has received approximately the same respect as his predecessor's.

Public outrage at the revelation of CIA involvement in assassination plots riveted attention on the investigation by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church Committee) in 1975; after the Rockefeller Commission, the first body to gather evidence, had failed to release any information or recommendations on assassinations in its final report.

In response to vocal public concern, Senator Church and others issued militant-sounding statements that "murder" by the government is intolerable and must be outlawed,

(continued on page 21)

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